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THE IMPORTANCE OF IMMUTABILITY IN EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION LAW
SHARONA HOFFMAN*
ABSTRACT
This Article argues that recent developments in employment
discrimination law require a renewed focus on the concept of immu-
table characteristics. In 2009, two new laws took effect: the Genetic
Information Nondiscrimination Act (GINA) and the Americans with
Disabilities Act Amendments Act (ADAAA). This Article’s original
contribution is an evaluation of the employment discrimination
statutes as a corpus of law in light of these two additions.
The Article thoroughly explores the meaning of the term “immuta-
ble characteristic” in constitutional and employment discrimination
jurisprudence. It postulates that immutability constitutes a unifying
principle for all of the traits now covered by the employment discrim-
ination laws. Immutability, however, does not explain why other
characteristics that are equally unalterable are excluded from the
statutory scheme. Thus, the Article concludes that the employment
discrimination laws lack coherence. While the laws extend even to
fringe religions, such as white supremacy, they disregard a variety
of traits that are fundamental to identity, including sexual orienta-
tion, parental status, and others. A focus on the concept of immuta-
bility can shed new light on the achievements and limitations of the
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antidiscrimination mandates and serve as an impetus to provide
more comprehensive protection to American workers.
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INTRODUCTION
The  field of employment discrimination has undergone signif-
icant transformation during the past two years. The Genetic
Information Nondiscrimination Act (GINA)1 was enacted on May 21,
2008, and its employment provisions became effective on November
21, 2009.2 Shortly thereafter, the Americans with Disabilities Act
Amendments Act (ADAAA)3 was signed into law on September 25,
2008, and became effective on January 1, 2009.4 This Article ana-
lyzes how these new legal provisions illuminate the purpose of the
corpus of law known as the employment discrimination statutes. It
argues that the passage of GINA and the ADAAA, which expand the
civil rights laws’ antidiscrimination protection based on biological
characteristics, requires a renewed focus on the concept of immuta-
ble characteristics. The Article offers an original, comprehensive
analysis of the meaning of the term “immutable characteristic.” It
then explores whether the term accurately describes the attributes
that are protected by the employment discrimination laws. 
The employment discrimination statutes instruct employers that
there are particular characteristics that generally may not be
considered for purposes of employment decisions. These characteris-
tics are race, color, national origin, sex, pregnancy, religion, age,
disability, genetic information, and citizenship status.5 Is there,
however, a unifying conceptual framework that explains the choices
we have made concerning the scope of the civil rights laws? Why are
employers prohibited from considering some attributes, such as sex
or national origin, but not others, such as political viewpoint,
appearance, marital or parental status, or sexual orientation?6 Do
1. Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act (GINA) of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-233, 122
Stat. 881.
2. 42 U.S.C. § 2000ff note (Supp. II 2009).
3. ADA Amendments Act (ADAAA) of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553.
4. 42 U.S.C. § 12102 note (Supp. II 2006).
5. See Immigration Reform and Control Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1324b(a) (2006); Equal Pay Act,
29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1); Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 623(a), 631(a);
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a); 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 2000ff(4), 2000ff-1(a) (West
Supp. 2010); Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a); GINA §§ 201(4), 202(a),
122 Stat. at 906-07.
6. See infra Part IV.C for discussion of these five attributes. 
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GINA and the ADAAA elucidate the nature of protected classifica-
tions, or do they cause further obfuscation? In short, what is the
project of the employment discrimination statutes?
Certainly, the passions and vicissitudes of politics strongly
influence what legislation is passed. Nevertheless, the antidiscrim-
ination endeavor is motivated by a desire to promote fairness and
justice. Consequently, this Article argues that careful scrutiny of the
laws reveals a distinct theme. 
This Article maintains that the concept of immutability brings us
closest to an understanding of the antidiscrimination mandates in
employment law. It is arguable that the employment discrimination
laws are designed to protect discrete and insular minorities with a
history of discrimination7 or to prohibit consideration of traits that
are irrelevant to job performance.8 Each of these theories, however,
is flawed, and immutability more accurately describes the charac-
teristics protected by the employment discrimination statutes. 
Nevertheless, although immutability explains the included char-
acteristics, it fails to explain some of the most notable exclusions
from the statutory scope. In fact, no coherent theory can be devel-
oped to elucidate why some unalterable traits are awarded protected
status by federal law and others are not.9 It is noteworthy that some
state laws cover traits that are not addressed by federal statutes,10
but state law varies significantly in scope and contents and thus
constitutes a patchwork. Only federal law can provide comprehen-
sive protection to workers across the nation. The recent additions of
GINA and the ADAAA may occasion an opportunity to reexamine
the purpose of the law and create a more rational and comprehen-
sive legislative protective scheme.
The Article makes several original contributions. Part I, which
describes the antidiscrimination laws both before and after 2008,
analyzes the ADAAA’s revised definition of “disability” and explores
whether any lasting physical or mental disabilities will be disquali-
fied from protected status.11 Part II outlines a variety of theories
7. See infra Part II.A.
8. See infra Part II.B.
9. See infra Part IV.
10. See infra Part IV.C.
11. See infra Part I.B.2.b.
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that have been used to explain the statutory employment discrimi-
nation endeavor and demonstrates that prohibiting discrimination
based on selected immutable characteristics most accurately
describes the laws’ achievement. Part III thoroughly explores the
meaning of the term “immutable characteristic” in both constitu-
tional and employment discrimination jurisprudence. It formulates
two alternative definitions of the term: (1) a characteristic that is an
accident of birth, or (2) a characteristic that is unchangeable or so
fundamental to personal identity that workers effectively cannot
and should not be required to change it for employment purposes.12
Part IV discusses a variety of traits that are immutable but are
omitted from statutory protection and evaluates whether each type
of exclusion is reasonable.13 Part V develops the argument that the
concept of immutability can be a liberalizing force that may spur the
addition of new protected classifications to the employment
discrimination laws.14 It also analyzes the relevance of immutability
to reasonable accommodation and argues that immutability may
explain the legislature’s ambivalence about the accommodation
mandate.15
I. PROTECTED STATUS UNDER THE EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION
LAWS
The federal employment discrimination laws prohibit discrimina-
tion based on the following categories: race, color, national origin,
sex, pregnancy, religion, age, disability, genetic information, and
citizenship status.16 This Part will describe the traditional grounds
for antidiscrimination protection and the most recent changes to the
employment discrimination field embodied in GINA and the
ADAAA.
12. See infra notes 151-60 and accompanying text.
13. See infra Part IV.C.
14. See infra Part V.B.
15. See infra Part V.C.
16. See statutes cited supra note 5.
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A. The Federal Antidiscrimination Laws: The Pre-2008 Landscape
During the second half of the twentieth century, a variety of
federal laws established antidiscrimination mandates to protect
American workers. The broadest, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 (Title VII), prohibits discrimination based on “race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin.”17 Sex discrimination includes
adverse decisions made because of “pregnancy, childbirth, or related
medical conditions.”18 
Several other laws are narrower in scope. The Equal Pay Act
(EPA) addresses salary disparities based on sex.19 The Age
Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) protects individuals who
are forty years old and older against age discrimination.20 The
Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) prohibits discrimina-
tion based on national origin or citizenship status against individu-
als who are entitled to work in the United States.21
The Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (Rehabilitation Act) and the
1990 Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) are designed to pro-
tect workers against discrimination based on disability.22 The
Rehabilitation Act applies only to programs and activities “receiving
Federal financial assistance” or “conducted by any Executive agency
or by the United States Postal Service.”23 The ADA extended the
antidiscrimination mandate to all public and private employers with
fifteen or more employees.24 The laws not only prohibit employers
from making disability-based adverse decisions, but also require
them to provide reasonable accommodations to qualified individuals
with disabilities.25 
However, the ADA’s original definition of “disability” challenged
litigants and courts.26 The ADA defined the term “disability” as: “(A)
17. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2006).
18. Id. § 2000e(k).
19. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1).
20. Id. §§ 623(a), 631(a).
21. 8 U.S.C. § 1324b(a).
22. 29 U.S.C. § 794; 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a).
23. 29 U.S.C. § 794(a).
24. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(5).
25. Id. § 12112(a), (b)(5)(A); 28 C.F.R. § 41.53 (2010).
26. The Rehabilitation Act’s definition of disability is similar to that of the ADA: “a
physical or mental impairment which for such individual constitutes or results in a
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a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or
more of the major life activities of ... [an] individual; (B) a record of
such an impairment; or (C) being regarded as having such an
impairment.”27 Courts most often interpreted this definition nar-
rowly, finding that various conditions either do not affect a major
life activity or are not sufficiently limiting to constitute disabilities
under the ADA.28 For example, one notorious case held that an
individual with mental retardation was not disabled for purposes of
the ADA.29 Several studies revealed that ADA plaintiffs won 5
percent or less of cases.30 
Furthermore, ADA jurisprudence failed to provide satisfying
answers to a number of critical questions: (1) What is a major life
activity? (2) What does “substantially limits” mean? (3) What
precisely must a plaintiff prove to be designated as disabled under
the “regarded as” prong of the definition? and (4) Does the ADA’s
prohibition of disability discrimination include adverse treatment
based on an asymptomatic individual’s genetic information?31 To
answer these questions and elucidate the scope of legal protection
enjoyed by applicants and employees, Congress intervened in 2008
with two additional statutory provisions. 
substantial impediment to employment.” 29 U.S.C. § 705(20)(A)(i). Prior to the ADA’s
enactment, this definition was not controversial, perhaps because governmental employers
were less inclined to challenge plaintiffs’ disability statuses than private employers who
sought to litigate every potentially winnable question. See Mary Crossley, The Disability
Kaleidoscope, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 621, 623 (1999) [hereinafter Crossley, Kaleidoscope]
(noting that disability status was rarely litigated under the Rehabilitation Act).
27. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2). See infra text accompanying note 63 for the definition of
“impairment.” 
28. See ADAAA, Pub. L. No. 110-325, § 2(a), 122 Stat. 3553, 3553 (2008) (discussing a
variety of Supreme Court cases that narrowed the definition of “disability” and motivated
Congress to amend the ADA).
29. Littleton v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 05-12770, 2007 WL 1379986, at *3-4 (11th Cir.
May 11, 2007) (holding that the plaintiff was not substantially limited with respect to any
major life activity).
30. See Sharona Hoffman, Settling the Matter: Does Title I of the ADA Work?, 59 ALA. L.
REV. 305, 308-09 (2008) (discussing studies concerning ADA case outcomes).
31. See ADAAA § 2(a), (b), 122 Stat. at 3553-54 (discussing Supreme Court cases that
addressed these questions); Paul Steven Miller, Is There A Pink Slip in My Genes? Genetic
Discrimination in the Workplace, 3 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL'Y 225, 238 (2000) (arguing that
“[t]he ADA can and should be interpreted to prohibit employment discrimination based on
asymptomatic genetic characteristics”).
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B. The New Additions: GINA and the ADAAA
GINA and the ADAAA focus on bias based on biological character-
istics and significantly enhance the antidiscrimination protection
available to American workers. This Section will analyze the key
provisions of each of the two statutes.
1. The Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act
The Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act was first intro-
duced in Congress in 1995 but was passed after thirteen years, in
2008.32 One reason for the statute’s extremely long gestation period
may be an absence of evidence that individuals were in fact being
subjected to discrimination because of genetic information.33 GINA
prohibits employers from making adverse employment decisions
based on genetic information, which is defined as an individual or
family member’s genetic tests or “the manifestation of a disease or
disorder in family members” of an individual.34 GINA also instructs
that employers may not “request, require, or purchase genetic infor-
mation” about an employee or her family members, with limited
exceptions.35
The first reported Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC) charge of discrimination alleging a GINA violation was filed
in April 2010.36 As of this writing, no lawsuits have been com-
menced, and no GINA decisions have thus far been issued by the
courts. 
32. Jessica L. Roberts, Preempting Discrimination: Lessons from the Genetic Information
Nondiscrimination Act, 63 VAND. L. REV. 439, 441 (2010).
33. Id.
34. GINA, Pub. L. No. 110-233, §§ 201(4), 202(a), 122 Stat. 881, 906-07 (2008) (to be
codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000ff(4), 2000ff-1(a)).
35. Id. § 202(b), 122 Stat. at 907-08.
36. Emily Friedman, Pamela Fink Says She Was Fired After Getting a Double Mastectomy
To Prevent Breast Cancer, ABC NEWS, Apr. 30, 2010, http://abcnews.go.com/Health/
OnCallPlusBreastCancerNews/pamela-fink-fired-testing-positive-breast-cancer-
gene/story?id=10510163. 
2011] THE IMPORTANCE OF IMMUTABILITY 1493
2. The ADA Amendments Act
The ADA Amendments Act considerably broadened and eluci-
dated the definition of the term “disability.”37 This expansion of the
statutory scope was accomplished through a variety of provisions.
It is difficult to predict the extent to which the ADAAA will impact
ultimate case outcomes, but the ADAAA should make it much easier
for plaintiffs to overcome the threshold obstacle of showing disabil-
ity status. In the future, therefore, litigation will likely focus on the
issues of worker qualifications, discriminatory animus, and reason-
able accommodation rather than on the particulars of the plain-
tiff ’s impairment.38 
a. Textual Changes
The ADAAA clarified and expanded the definition of “disability.”
It lists specific functions that constitute major life activities, though
the list is not exclusive.39 Major life activities include “caring for
oneself, performing manual tasks, seeing, hearing, eating, sleeping,
walking, standing, lifting, bending, speaking, breathing, learning,
reading, concentrating, thinking, communicating, and working.”40
They also include major bodily functions such as those of the
“immune system, normal cell growth, digestive, bowel, bladder,
neurological, brain, respiratory, circulatory, endocrine, and reproduc-
tive” systems.41
Perhaps most significantly, the ADAAA liberalized the definition
of being “regarded as” having an impairment. Under the new pro-
vision, an individual is deemed to have a disability if she has “an
actual or perceived physical or mental impairment whether or not
the impairment limits or is perceived to limit a major life activity.”42
Only “transitory and minor” impairments, namely those lasting six
37. The new definition applies to both the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA. 29 U.S.C. §
705(9)(B) (2006); ADAAA, Pub. L. No. 110-325, § 7(1), 122 Stat. 3553, 3558 (2008).
38. See infra note 81 and accompanying text.
39. 42 U.S.C.A. § 12102(1) (West Supp. 2010).
40. Id. § 12102(2)(A).
41. Id. § 12102(2)(B).
42. Id. § 12102(3)(A).
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months or less, are excluded from coverage.43 This language means
that anyone who has a long-term physical or mental impairment,
regardless of its severity, is included under the “regarded as” prong
of the ADA.
The statute’s new breadth is emphasized in several additional
provisions. The ADAAA specifically instructs that the definition of
“disability” is to be interpreted broadly, to the maximum extent
allowed by the relevant wording.44 It also rebukes the courts for
having required plaintiffs to show an excessively high degree of
limitation in order to meet the “substantially limits” statutory
standard.45 Furthermore, under the ADAAA, impairments are
covered so long as they limit one major life activity, and conditions
that are episodic or in remission constitute disabilities if they would
substantially limit a major life activity in their active state.46 
A particularly celebrated change is one that rejects the Supreme
Court decision in Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc.47 concerning miti-
gating measures.48 The ADAAA clearly establishes that disability
status is to be determined without regard to whether a condition’s
symptoms can be alleviated through the use of medication, behav-
ioral modifications, or devices (other than “ordinary eyeglasses or
contact lenses”).49 Finally, the law asserts that the threshold
question of whether an individual has a “disability” for statutory
purposes “should not demand extensive analysis” and that the focus
of attention in ADA cases should be upon whether covered entities
engaged in discrimination in violation of the law.50
b. How Broad Is the ADA’s Post-Amendment Coverage?
The ADA’s antidiscrimination mandate has become expansive
since the ADAAA’s implementation. The change is so dramatic that
employers should rarely succeed in challenging a plaintiff’s
43. Id. § 12102(3)(B).
44. Id. § 12102(4)(A).
45. Id. § 12102(4)(B); ADAAA, Pub. L. No. 110-325, § 2(b)(5), 122 Stat. 3553, 3554 (2008).
46. 42 U.S.C.A. § 12102(4)(C), (D).
47. 527 U.S. 471 (1999).
48. ADAAA § 2(b)(2), 122 Stat. at 3554.
49. 42 U.S.C.A. § 12102(4)(E) (West Supp. 2010).
50. ADAAA § 2(b)(5), 122 Stat. at 3554.
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disability status in cases that do not involve a request for reason-
able accommodations.51 Many conditions that, to the surprise of
many observers, courts previously deemed not to constitute dis-
abilities should now fall comfortably into the disability category.
Because the ADAAA rejected the Supreme Court’s conclusion that
conditions that were well-controlled by mitigating measures did not
constitute disabilities,52 individuals with impairments such as
epilepsy, diabetes, and learning disabilities, who routinely failed to
prove they were entitled to ADA protection,53 should henceforth
enjoy statutory coverage. The existence of medications that alleviate
the symptoms of epilepsy and diabetes and techniques to overcome
the limitations caused by learning disabilities should no longer be
relevant to the disability status analysis. The ADAAA’s inclusion of
conditions that are episodic should also assist individuals with
epilepsy because seizures are generally periodic rather than con-
stant.54 
Cancer patients and survivors should benefit significantly from
the ADAAA, particularly in light of its coverage of illnesses in
remission.55 Courts had traditionally denied ADA remedies in cases
involving cancer because plaintiffs faced a Catch-22: they were
either suffering from the disease and too sick to be qualified to
work, or they were tolerating treatment well or in remission and
51. For a discussion of reasonable accommodations, see infra notes 74-80 and
accompanying text.
52. 42 U.S.C.A. § 12102(4)(E).
53. H.R. REP. NO. 110-730, pt. 2, at 20-21 (2008) (discussing cases that would likely be
decided differently under the revised standard); Alex B. Long, Introducing the New and
Improved Americans with Disabilities Act: Assessing the ADA Amendments Act of 2008, 103
NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 217, 220 (2008), http://www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/
colloquy/2008/44/LRColl2008n44Long.pdf (noting that plaintiffs who used prosthetic devices
or who took drugs to control the symptoms of epilepsy, diabetes, or bipolar disorder often were
found not to have disabilities); see, e.g., Collado v. United Parcel Serv., Co., 419 F.3d 1143,
1154-58 (11th Cir. 2005) (finding that an individual with diabetes who was insulin-dependent
was not disabled for statutory purposes); Brunke v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 344 F.3d
819, 821-22 (8th Cir. 2003) (concluding that an individual with epilepsy whose medication
significantly diminished his seizures did not have a disability); Gonzales v. Nat’l Bd. of Med.
Exam’rs, 225 F.3d 620, 629-30 (6th Cir. 2000) (determining that an individual with a learning
disability who had found ways to achieve academic success despite his limitations did not
have a disability under the ADA).
54. 42 U.S.C.A. § 12102(4)(D); H.R. REP. NO. 110-730, pt. 2, at 19.
55. 42 U.S.C.A. § 12102(4)(D).
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thus were not found to have met the statutory standard.56 Now
patients whose cancer is either active or in remission57 should be
included as protected class members. Proposed EEOC regulations
state that cancer is an impairment that “will consistently meet the
definition of disability” as a condition that substantially limits the
major life activity of normal cell growth.58 Because illnesses in
remission are to be considered in their active state for definitional
purposes,59 even cancer in remission should always be deemed a
disability. Furthermore, according to the proposed regulations,
individuals who are considered to be fully cured of cancer will still
be covered by the ADA under the definition’s “record of ” prong,
which applies to anyone who has been diagnosed in the past with a
substantially limiting impairment.60 Therefore, workers with any
cancer history, no matter how distant, should be found to be
individuals with disabilities under the ADA.
The revised “regarded as” prong of the disability definition61 is
likely to be the most transformative improvement for ADA plain-
tiffs. The provision extends to any mental or physical impairment
that serves as a basis for an employer’s adverse decision, regardless
of the impairment’s impact on the worker,62 and therefore few if any
lasting medical conditions will fall outside of the ADA’s sphere. The
term “impairment” is not defined in the statute, but the federal
regulations provide a far-reaching definition: 
56. For an analysis of how courts treat cancer cases, see Jane Byeff Korn, Cancer and the
ADA: Rethinking Disability, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 399 (2001); see also Sharona Hoffman,
Corrective Justice and Title I of the ADA, 52 AM. U. L. REV. 1213, 1232 (2003) (discussing the
Catch-22 phenomenon).
57. Remission is defined as “[a]batement or subsiding of the symptoms of a disease” or
“[t]he period during which the symptoms of a disease abate or subside.” THE AMERICAN
HERITAGE MEDICAL DICTIONARY 464 (2007).
58. Regulations To Implement the Equal Employment Provisions of the Americans with
Disabilities Act, 74 Fed. Reg. 48,439, 48,441 (Sept. 23, 2009) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. §
1630.2(j)(5)(B)).
59. 42 U.S.C.A. § 12102(4)(D).
60. 42 U.S.C.A. § 12102(1)(B) (defining “disability” in part as a record of a substantially
limiting impairment); Regulations To Implement the Equal Employment Provisions of the
Americans with Disabilities Act, 74 Fed. Reg. at 48,443 (to be codified at 29 C.F.R.
§ 1630.2(k)(1)(i)).
61. 42 U.S.C.A. § 12102(3).
62. Id.
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(1) Any physiological disorder, or condition, cosmetic disfigure-
ment, or anatomical loss affecting one or more of the following
body systems: neurological, musculoskeletal, special sense
organs, respiratory (including speech organs), cardiovascular,
reproductive, digestive, genito-urinary, hemic and lymphatic,
skin, and endocrine; or 
(2) Any mental or psychological disorder, such as mental
retardation, organic brain syndrome, emotional or mental
illness, and specific learning disabilities.63
Absent the “substantially limiting” requirement, plaintiffs
alleging discriminatory employer conduct—as opposed to a need for
reasonable accommodation—will generally be able to pass the
threshold disability status test with little difficulty.64 Prior to the
ADAAA, individuals with back impairments and cosmetic disfigure-
ments were often denied ADA coverage because the courts did not
believe they were substantially limited with respect to a major life
activity.65 Post-ADAAA, however, plaintiffs who were denied em-
ployment opportunities because of back abnormalities could likely
successfully claim that the employer regarded them as having a
musculoskeletal impairment, and those with disfiguring skin
ailments or scars could establish that they were regarded as dis-
abled because of their cosmetic deformities.66 Such plaintiffs would
be free of the obligation to prove that their conditions limited their
activities in any way.
Still, not all conditions will be covered even under the ADAAA’s
expanded definition of disability. Most notably, obesity that is not
accompanied by cardiovascular or other disease symptoms is likely
63. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h) (2009).
64. H.R. REP. NO. 110-730, pt. 2, at 18 (2008) (stating that the “regarded as” provision’s
exception for transitory and minor impairments should be read narrowly and applies to
conditions that are no more serious than a “cold or flu”).
65. See Mahon v. Crowell, 295 F.3d 585, 591 (6th Cir. 2002) (finding—before the
ADAAA—that plaintiff’s back impairment did not constitute a disability); Gray v. Ameritech
Corp., 937 F. Supp. 762, 769-70 (N.D. Ill. 1996) (finding against a plaintiff with psoriasis that
produced white, flaking sores on her face and body because she did not meet the disability
standard).
66. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(l) app. (providing the example of an individual with a facial scar
or disfigurement as someone who might be able to prove disability status under the “regarded
as” prong of the definition). 
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to remain excluded,67 despite evidence that obese individuals
experience discrimination in the workplace.68 Experts have deter-
mined that obesity is caused by a “complex interplay of genetic,
nutritional, physiological, psychological, environmental, and social
factors.”69 Nevertheless, while obesity has a physiological basis, it
does not fall clearly into any impairment category.70 Professor Jane
Korn argues that obesity could be considered a cosmetic disfigure-
ment that receives the same treatment as a severe scar,71 but EEOC
regulations provide that “except in rare circumstances, obesity is not
considered a disabling impairment.”72 The federal regulations
provide the following additional examples of impairments that are
considered nondisabling even under the “regarded as” prong because
of their typically short duration: “broken limbs, sprained joints,
concussions, appendicitis, and influenza.”73 It is conceivable that an
employer would make an adverse decision based on one of these
conditions, and such a decision would not violate the ADA.
Unlike the disability definition, the law’s reasonable accommoda-
tion provision was not broadened by the ADAAA.74 Consequently,
plaintiffs will continue to find it challenging to prevail in reasonable
accommodation cases. The ADAAA explicitly establishes that em-
ployers need not provide reasonable accommodation to individuals
who are covered by the ADA only by virtue of being regarded as
67. Jane Korn, Too Fat, 17 VA. J. SOC. POL'Y & L. 209, 211 (2010) (postulating that obesity
will remain outside the scope of the ADA).
68. Id. at 221; Rebecca M. Puhl & Chelsea A. Heuer, The Stigma of Obesity: A Review and
Update, 17 OBESITY 941, 941 (2009) (“Weight bias translates into inequities in employment
settings, health-care facilities, and educational institutions, often due to widespread negative
stereotypes that overweight and obese persons are lazy, unmotivated, lacking in self-
discipline, less competent, non-compliant, and sloppy.”); Lucy Wang, Note, Weight
Discrimination: One Size Fits All Remedy?, 117 YALE L.J. 1900, 1910-21 (2008) (discussing
weight discrimination). 
69. AM. MED. ASS'N, ASSESSMENT AND MANAGEMENT OF ADULT OBESITY: A PRIMER FOR
PHYSICIANS 6 (2003), available at http://www.ama-assn.org/ama1/pub/upload/mm/433/
booklet1.pdf; see also NAT’L INSTS. OF HEALTH, THE PRACTICAL GUIDE: IDENTIFICATION,
EVALUATION, AND TREATMENT OF OVERWEIGHT AND OBESITY IN ADULTS 5 (2000), available at
http://www.nhlbi.nih.gov/ guidelines/obesity/prctgd_c.pdf. 
70. See M. Neil Browne et al., Obesity as a Protected Category: The Complexity of Personal
Responsibility for Physical Attributes, 14 MICH. ST. U. J. MED. & L. 1, 62-63 (2010).
71. Korn, supra note 67, at 247-48.
72. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j) app. (2009). The regulation does not detail what rare
circumstances would render obesity a disability.
73. Id.
74. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (2006).
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disabled.75 Plaintiffs seeking reasonable accommodations will,
therefore, be required to prove that they are substantially limited
in a major life activity, as defined by the ADAAA.76 
The ADAAA is silent concerning one potential conundrum. There
may be plaintiffs who could ameliorate their conditions through
mitigating measures such as medication, surgeries, or assistive
devices but choose not to do so or cannot afford the cost of such
interventions.77 It is unclear whether such workers would be en-
titled to reasonable accommodation, and this question will need to
be resolved through judicial interpretation.78 It is possible that
courts would deem accommodation in such cases to be “unreason-
able” because the plaintiff could have diminished or eliminated the
need for it.
Reasonable accommodation plaintiffs will benefit from some of
the provisions that relax the definition of disability. The nonexclu-
sive list of major life activities79 and the instruction that the
definition is to be construed “in favor of broad coverage”80 will make
it easier for contemporary reasonable accommodation plaintiffs to
prove that they have a disability. Nevertheless, only a subset of
plaintiffs who can assert disability discrimination claims under the
ADA is eligible for reasonable accommodation.
In addition, the liberalized definition of disability will not
guarantee that more plaintiffs will ultimately prevail in ADA cases.
Courts may rule against plaintiffs on numerous grounds other than
lack of disability status.81 For example, a court may determine that
a plaintiff was not qualified for the job in question, that the em-
ployer’s adverse decision lacked discriminatory animus and was
based on a legitimate factor such as job performance, or that no
75. See ADAAA, Pub. L. No. 110-325, § 6(h), 122 Stat. 3553, 3558 (2008).
76. Long, supra note 53, at 225.
77. 42 U.S.C.A. § 12102(4)(E)(i)(I) (West Supp. 2010) (discussing mitigating measures).
78. See Jeannette Cox, Crossroads and Signposts: The ADA Amendments Act of 2008, 85
IND. L.J. 187, 217-20 (2010) (questioning whether plaintiffs who could ameliorate their
conditions through mitigating measures but chose not to do so will be entitled to reasonable
accommodation). 
79. 42 U.S.C.A. § 12102(2).
80. Id. § 12102(4)(A).
81. Ruth Colker, Speculation About Judicial Outcomes Under 2008 ADA Amendments:
Cause for Concern, UTAH L. REV. (forthcoming 2011) (collecting data from 200 pre-ADAAA
cases and finding that, even before 2009, failure to accommodate was “the most frequent kind
of discrimination issue raised in these cases,” appearing 36 percent of the time).
1500 WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 52:1483
reasonable accommodation can be found for the individual. The
ADAAA will shift the analysis away from the disability question to
more substantive questions of discrimination and spare plaintiffs
the indignity of having their cases dismissed because courts do not
deem them disabled enough to merit legal protection.
II. FINDING A UNIFYING PRINCIPLE
In light of the passage of GINA and the ADAAA, it is appropriate
to reevaluate the basis on which employment discrimination law
extends protection to American workers. The question this Article
explores is whether any unifying principle explains the choices
American law has made with respect to protected classifications.
Can employment discrimination law be understood to offer a coher-
ent vision of what types of employer choices should be allowed and
disallowed? This Part discusses several alternative unifying prin-
ciples.
A. Discrete and Insular Minorities with a History of             
Discrimination
Many commentators and courts have viewed antidiscrimination
law as seeking to protect discrete and insular minorities that have
suffered a history of discrimination.82 In the context of constitutional
analysis, the famous “footnote 4” in the 1938 case of United States
v. Carolene Products Co. contemplates that “prejudice against dis-
crete and insular minorities may be a special condition, which tends
seriously to curtail the operation of those political processes ordi-
narily to be relied upon to protect minorities, and which may call for
82. Trina Jones, Shades of Brown: The Law of Skin Color, 49 DUKE L.J. 1487, 1537 (2000)
(discussing Title VII and stating that “skin color (like race) has been and continues to be used
as a basis for identifying underrepresented discrete and insular minorities within racial
classifications”); Scott A. Moss, Where There’s At-Will, There Are Many Ways: Redressing the
Increasing Incoherence of Employment At Will, 67 U. PITT. L. REV. 295, 363 (2005) (noting that
“Title VII and similar laws” brought constitutional “discrimination protections for ‘discrete
and insular minorities’” into the private sector); Julie Chi-hye Suk, Equal By Comparison:
Unsettling Assumptions of Antidiscrimination Law, 55 AM. J. COMP. L. 295, 341 (2007)
(asserting that “U.S. antidiscrimination law has focused on protecting individuals as members
of groups, not individuals’ personal rights”).
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a correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry.”83 Almost half a
century later, the Supreme Court further developed the justification
for protected status, stating that “the traditional indicia of sus-
pectness” are that “the class is ... saddled with such disabilities, or
subjected to such a history of purposeful unequal treatment, or
relegated to such a position of political powerlessness as to com-
mand extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political
process.”84
The Supreme Court’s language suggests a two-part test: groups
are entitled to protected status if they (1) constitute a discrete and
insular minority, and (2) have suffered a history of discrimination.
Each of the two factors will be analyzed separately as they apply to
the antidiscrimination statutes. 
The “discrete and insular minority” framework is a questionable
fit for employment discrimination law. The ADA is the only statute
that explicitly claimed to protect a discrete and insular minority. Its
Findings and Purpose section originally asserted that there are
forty-three million Americans with disabilities and that they are “a
discrete and insular minority who have been faced with restrictions
and limitations, subjected to a history of purposeful unequal treat-
ment, and relegated to a position of political powerlessness.”85
Ironically, this language was used by courts to justify a narrow
interpretation of the term “disability” and frequently to rule against
plaintiffs who claimed to have disabilities.86 The “discrete and
insular minority” designation was ultimately rejected by the
83. 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
84. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973) (applying rational
basis analysis to uphold a school financing system that relied on property taxes to the
disadvantage of families that were not wealthy and resided in low property tax base areas);
see also Mass. Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 313-14 (1976) (finding that older
individuals are not a discrete and insular minority with a history of discrimination and
upholding a statute that established a mandatory retirement age for state police officers).
85. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(1), (7) (2000) (amended 2008).
86. Sutton v. United Air Lines, 527 U.S. 471, 484 (1999) (stating that the 43 million figure
was meant to narrow the category of individuals with disabilities who are covered by the
ADA); H.R. REP. NO. 110-730, pt. 2, at 15 (2008) (noting that based on this language, the
Supreme Court determined that “the ADA’s definition of disability should be interpreted
strictly, rather than broadly as Congress had intended”); Cox, supra note 78, at 209 (“The
Supreme Court had construed this finding as representing a ceiling, rather than a floor, on
the number of persons able to bring ADA claims.”).
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ADAAA and no longer appears in the Findings and Purpose
provision.87 
It is even more difficult to characterize many of the other groups
covered by the employment discrimination laws as discrete and
insular minorities. Title VII protects all workers against discrimina-
tion based on race, color, national origin, religion, and sex, even if
they are white, male, and Christian.88 Similarly, the EPA applies to
both men and women who are subjected to pay discrimination
because of sex.89 The ADEA covers anyone who is forty or older90 and
thus applies to almost half of the American population.91 
Although the “discrete and insular minority” designation does not
apply to most classes, a history of discrimination against various
groups clearly motivated Congress to pass many of the employment
discrimination laws and is often explicitly referenced in statutory
language. Title VII is commonly understood to have been designed
first and foremost to combat pervasive discrimination against
African Americans.92 The Equal Pay Act’s Declaration of Purpose
87. ADAAA, Pub. L. No. 110-325, § 3, 122 Stat. 3553, 3554-55 (2008); H.R. REP. NO. 110-
730, pt. 2, at 15.
88. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2006); Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 526 (1980)
(Stewart, J., dissenting) (asserting that racial discrimination is no less pernicious when the
victim is not a member of a racial minority); Dawn V. Martin, 911: How Will Police and Fire
Departments Respond to Public Safety Needs and the Americans with Disabilities Act?, 2
N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL'Y 37, 70 n.194 (1998-99) (“In the Title VII context, it is not only
the discrete and insular minority which is protected against discrimination, but also members
of the majority group.”).
89. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (generally prohibiting pay disparities based on sex).
90. Id. § 631(a). 
91. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 2006-2008 AMERICAN COMMUNITY SURVEY 3-YEAR ESTIMATES
tbl. 50101, available at http://factfinder.census.gov/servlet/STTable?_bm=y&-geo_id=01000US
&-qr_name =ACS_2008_3YR_G00_S0101&-ds_name=ACS_2008_3YR_G00_ (indicating what
percentage of the American population falls into various age groups); see also Mass. Bd. of
Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 313-14 (1976) (noting that the elderly are not a discrete and
insular minority because old age is “a stage that each of us will reach if we live out our normal
span”); Goldstein v. Manhattan Indus., 758 F.2d 1435, 1442 (11th Cir. 1985) (“Age
discrimination is qualitatively different from race or sex discrimination in employment,
because the basis of the discrimination is not a discrete and immutable characteristic of an
employee which separates the members of the protected group indelibly from persons outside
the protected group. Rather, age is a continuum along which the distinctions between
employees are often subtle and relative ones.”).
92. United Steelworkers of Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 246 n.25 (1979) (“The whole
purpose of Title VII was to deprive employers of their ‘traditional business freedom’ to
discriminate on the basis of race.”); C. Elizabeth Hirsh, Settling for Less? Organizational
Determinants of Discrimination-Charge Outcomes, 42 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 239, 269 (2008)
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explains that the “existence ... of wage differentials based on sex ...
depresses wages and living standards for employees necessary for
their health and efficiency.”93 The reality of discrimination, there-
fore, justified the law’s enactment. The ADEA’s Statement of
Findings and Purpose refers to the hurdles that confront older
Americans in the workplace and thus to historical evidence that
substantiates the need for legislative intervention.94 According to
the ADEA, older workers experience difficulty in retaining or re-
gaining employment, commonly face arbitrary age limits regardless
of their job performance, suffer a disproportionately high rate of
unemployment, and are subjected to “arbitrary discrimination in
employment because of age.”95 Similarly, the ADA emphasizes the
history and continuing presence of discrimination against individu-
als with disabilities in its Findings and Purpose section.96 
Nevertheless, the history of discrimination theory, like the dis-
crete and insular minority model, does not apply to all of the
protected classes. As noted above, Title VII protects “white men and
white women and all Americans.”97 Nonminorities can file reverse
discrimination cases even though their communities have not
historically been subjected to persistent discrimination.98
Furthermore, the passage of GINA and the ADAAA raises new
questions about the conceptualization of employment discrimination
law as addressing either discrete and insular minorities or a history
of discrimination. GINA was enacted despite a dearth of evidence
of genetic discrimination  in employment.99 Its Findings section
cites only one example of genetic discrimination and promises to
“allay ... concerns about the potential for discrimination.”100 Thus,
(“Title VII was originally introduced to eradicate a history of discrimination against racial
minorities, specifically African Americans.”).
93. Equal Pay Act of 1963, Pub. L. No. 88-38, § 2(a)(1), 77 Stat. 56, 56. 
94. 29 U.S.C. § 621(a).
95. Id.
96. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a) (2000) (amended 2008).
97. McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 280 (1976).
98. Id.
99. See Roberts, supra note 32, at 441 (arguing that GINA constitutes preemptive
legislation); Laurie A. Vasichek, Genetic Discrimination in the Workplace: Lessons from the
Past and Concerns for the Future, 3 ST. LOUIS U. J. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 13, 39 (2009) (noting
that unlike the other employment discrimination statutes, GINA is designed to eliminate
discrimination “before it takes root”).
100. GINA, Pub. L. No. 110-233, § 2(4), (5), 122 Stat. 881, 882-83 (2008). The cited case is
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GINA does not combat an established history of discrimination.
Furthermore, because all individuals have a genetic makeup, the
statute does not protect a discrete and insular minority. Rather, it
prohibits discrimination based on any type of genetic information,
whatever the content of that information may be, and consequently
covers the entire American population.101
Likewise, as noted above, the ADAAA eliminated the statutory
language suggesting that individuals with disabilities are a discrete
and insular minority.102 The Findings and Purpose provision retains
a discussion of the history of discrimination against those with
disabilities.103 However, because the protected class now includes
individuals with any physical or mental impairment other than
minor or transient ones,104 many covered workers will not have
conditions that are historically associated with discrimination.
GINA and the ADAAA, therefore, make it impossible to characterize
the employment discrimination laws as consistently seeking to
protect discrete and insular groups that have suffered a history of
discrimination.
B. The Formal Equality Model
An alternative conception of employment discrimination law is
that it is designed to protect individuals who are well-qualified for
a job but may be excluded by employers because of prejudice. Thus,
employment discrimination law may be seen as attempting to align
jobs with worker qualifications and to eliminate biased consider-
ation of attributes, such as race, that are irrelevant to job perfor-
Norman-Bloodsaw v. Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory, 135 F.3d 1260, 1272 (9th Cir. 1998)
(holding that an employer who administered nonconsensual preemployment tests for sickle-
cell trait could be found to violate Title VII).
101. GINA § 202(a), 122 Stat. at 907. 
102. ADAAA, Pub. L. No. 110-325, § 3, 122 Stat. 3553, 3554-55 (2008); see also Crossley,
Kaleidoscope, supra note 26, at 659-65 (critiquing the minority group model of disability).
103. 42 U.S.C.A. § 12101(a) (West Supp. 2010).
104. Id. § 12102(3)(A) (explaining that individuals are regarded as disabled for statutory
purposes so long as they are subjected to discrimination “because of an actual or perceived
physical or mental impairment whether or not the impairment limits or is perceived to limit
a major life activity”). See supra Part I.B.2.b for further discussion.
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mance.105 This understanding of the antidiscrimination laws has
been described as the “formal equality” model.106 
In a nonemployment context, a Supreme Court plurality opinion
appeared to espouse the formal equality principle when it recog-
nized sex as a suspect criterion because “the sex characteristic
frequently bears no relation to ability to perform or contribute to
society.”107 In a later race case, Justice Stewart asserted that
immutable characteristics “bear no relation to ability, disadvantage,
[or] moral culpability.”108
The formal equality model fits several of the antidiscrimination
requirements. Academic commentators have long contended that
Title VII is based on the assumption that race is always immaterial
to employees’ competence and thus, the law attempted simply to
level the playing field for minority groups.109 Several of the other
employment discrimination laws explicitly emphasize that the
protected class at issue could thrive in employment but for discrimi-
natory exclusion. The ADEA condemns “the setting of arbitrary age
limits regardless of potential for job performance.”110 Similarly, the
ADA speaks of “the continuing existence of unfair and unnecessary
discrimination and prejudice [that] denies people with disabilities
the opportunity to compete on an equal basis.”111 
105. William R. Corbett, The Ugly Truth About Appearance Discrimination and the Beauty
of Our Employment Discrimination Law, 14 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 153, 175-76 (2007);
Mary Crossley, Reasonable Accommodation as Part and Parcel of the Antidiscrimination
Project, 35 RUTGERS L.J. 861, 868-69 (2004) [hereinafter Crossley, Reasonable Accommo-
dation].
106. Lisa Eichhorn, Hostile Environment Actions, Title VII, and the ADA: The Limits of the
Copy-and-Paste Function, 77 WASH. L. REV. 575, 580-82 (2002).
107. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686-87 (1973) (plurality opinion) (further noting
that “statutory distinctions between the sexes often have the effect of invidiously relegating
the entire class of females to inferior legal status without regard to the actual capabilities of
its individual members”).
108. Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 525 (1980) (Stewart, J., dissenting). The majority
upheld the Minority Business Enterprise provision of the Public Works Employment Act of
1977, which provided a 10 percent set-aside for minority group members. Id. at 453, 491-92
(majority opinion).
109. Crossley, Reasonable Accommodation, supra note 105, at 869; Samuel Issacharoff &
Justin Nelson, Discrimination with a Difference: Can Employment Discrimination Law
Accommodate the Americans with Disabilities Act?, 79 N.C. L. REV. 307, 314 (2001).
110. 29 U.S.C. § 621(a)(2) (2006).
111. 42 U.S.C.A. § 12101(a)(8) (West Supp. 2010).
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Nevertheless, the formal equality model appears less compelling
when one considers the reasonable accommodation mandate that
applies to disabilities and religious practices. Under the ADA and
Title VII, affirmative steps must be taken to facilitate job perfor-
mance for those who are not capable of functioning in the workplace
without certain modifications. The ADA requires employers to
provide reasonable accommodations for qualified individuals with
disabilities,112 and it defines a “qualified individual” as one who
could perform the essential job functions with or without an accom-
modation.113 Title VII establishes a reasonable accommodation re-
quirement to benefit individuals whose religious practices conflict
with job requirements,114 though employers need not bear more than
a de minimis burden in providing such accommodations.115 Thus,
Title VII and the ADA prohibit employers from excluding workers
who cannot fulfill all job requirements because of religious beliefs or
disabilities so long as reasonable accommodations can be provided
without undue hardship.116 
Professor Christine Jolls argues convincingly that other statutory
provisions effectively constitute reasonable accommodation man-
dates as well.117 The employment discrimination statutes prohibit
employers from implementing policies or selection criteria that have
a disparate impact on particular protected groups unless these can
be justified through a business necessity defense.118 Thus, employers
have been required to abandon employment tests that disadvan-
taged African Americans and were found not to be sufficiently
related to job performance.119 They also had to relax strict no-beard
policies to which some African American men could not adhere
112. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (2006). 
113. Id. § 12111(8).
114. Id. § 2000e(j).
115. Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 84 (1977).
116. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e(j), 12112(b)(5)(A).
117. Christine Jolls, Commentary, Antidiscrimination and Accommodation, 115 HARV. L.
REV. 642, 645 (2001).
118. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A) (establishing Title VII’s disparate impact prohibition);
id. § 12112(b)(3) (establishing the ADA’s disparate impact prohibition); Meacham v. Knolls
Atomic Power Lab., 554 U.S. 84, 95-100 (2008) (explaining the ADEA’s disparate impact
standard); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971) (stating that Title VII
“proscribes not only overt discrimination but also practices that are fair in form, but
discriminatory in operation”).
119. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 433.
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because they suffered from the skin condition pseudofolliculitis
barbae.120 The disparate impact theory goes beyond requiring
employers simply to ignore irrelevant attributes and treat all
individuals equally. Instead, it forces employers to forsake facially
neutral, preferred procedures in order to avoid creating hindrances
to the success of protected class members.121
In addition, according to Professor Jolls, the antidiscrimination
laws’ disallowance of a customer preference defense is likewise akin
to a reasonable accommodation requirement.122 Employers may not
be excused from statutory compliance even if they can prove that
hiring members of a particular protected class, such as women or
minorities, will impact their profitability because customers will be
uncomfortable with these employees.123 For example, in Fernandez
v. Wynn Oil Co., the defendant contended that its South American
customers would refuse to do business with a female Director of
International Operations.124 The Ninth Circuit, however, instructed
that “stereotyped customer preference [does not] justify a sexually
discriminatory practice.”125 Accordingly, employers are forbidden to
consider designated characteristics even when these are clearly not
irrelevant because they will result in a loss of business.
The reasonable accommodation and disparate impact provisions
and the rejection of a customer preference defense undermine the
persuasiveness of the argument that the employment discrimination
laws seek merely to ensure that fully qualified employees are
treated equally and are not subjected to differentiation because of
employers’ blind ignorance and prejudice. Rather, they endorse, at
least in theory, a redistribution of resources,126 obligating employers
120. Bradley v. Pizzaco of Neb., Inc., 7 F.3d 795, 797-99 (8th Cir. 1993); Bradley v. Pizzaco
of Neb., Inc., 939 F.2d 610, 612-13 (8th Cir. 1991); Jolls, supra note 117, at 653 (“[E]mployers
may be required by disparate impact law to excuse particular groups of workers ... from
facially neutral grooming rules that serve employers’ business interests and were adopted
solely for that reason.”).
121. Jolls, supra note 117, at 672 (emphasizing that “disparate impact liability imposes
accommodation requirements”).
122. Id. at 686-87.
123. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.2(a)(1)(iii) (2009) (establishing that the refusal to hire an individual
because of client or customer preference constitutes discrimination).
124. 653 F.2d 1273, 1276 (9th Cir. 1981).
125. Id. at 1277.
126. Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Future of Disability Law, 114 YALE L.J. 1, 54 (2004). The
article argues, however, that the courts have eviscerated the reasonable accommodation
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to absorb certain costs or inconvenience in order to ensure opportu-
nities for protected class members.127 
C. Immutable Characteristics
A third option is to view the employment discrimination laws as
protecting workers based on immutable characteristics.128 Despite
the shortcomings of the formal equality model,129 it is indisputable
that the employment discrimination laws designate particular
characteristics as off-limits and immaterial to employers’ decision-
making processes. The laws, however, do not cover all factors that
are intuitively irrelevant, such as musical preferences or eating
habits.130 It is therefore natural to ask whether the protected
classifications constitute random choices or embody some cohesive
rationale. 
The concept of immutability provides a promising approach to
answering this question. Race, color, national origin, sex, and age
can all be deemed immutable in the sense that they are unchange-
able.131 Citizenship status is unalterable until one becomes eligible
for naturalization.132 Although individuals can theoretically convert
to a different religion, many feel that religion is central to their
personal identity and that adherence to their religious beliefs and
practices is required by higher powers, so that conversion is out of
the question.133 GINA and the ADAAA make the immutability
mandate to such a degree as “to assimilate ... [it] very closely to a classic antidiscrimination
requirement.” Id. at 42. 
127. See Crossley, Reasonable Accommodation, supra note 105, at 873-74.
128. See, e.g., Hohider v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 574 F.3d 169, 190 (3d Cir. 2009)
(asserting that Title VII “protects all individuals from discrimination motivated by the
immutable characteristics specified in the statute”); Willingham v. Macon Tel. Publ’g Co., 507
F.2d 1084, 1091 (5th Cir. 1975) (“Equal employment opportunity may be secured only when
employers are barred from discriminating against employees on the basis of immutable
characteristics, such as race and national origin.”) (emphasis omitted).
129. See supra Part II.B.
130. See supra note 5 and accompanying text (listing the employment discrimination laws
and the characteristics they protect).
131. See infra Part III.B.2 for further discussion.
132. See infra notes 171-73 and accompanying text.
133. Catarina Kinnvall, Globalization and Religious Nationalism: Self, Identity, and the
Search for Ontological Security, 25 POL. PSYCHOL. 741, 763 (2004) (discussing the importance
of religion as an “identity-signifier[ ]”); Renate Ysseldyk et al., Religiosity as Identity: Toward
an Understanding of Religion from a Social Identity Perspective, 14 PERSONALITY & SOC.
2011] THE IMPORTANCE OF IMMUTABILITY 1509
characterization increasingly compelling. Individuals’ genetic make-
up and mental or physical impairments are biological attributes and
are largely unchosen and unchangeable.134 These two statutes,
therefore, validate and bolster the generalization that the law pro-
hibits employment discrimination based on immutable characteris-
tics. 
Yet, a review of case law and legal scholarship reveals that the
meaning of the term “immutable characteristic” in the civil rights
context is surprisingly murky. Part III explores whether a coherent
definition of the term “immutable characteristic” emerges from
constitutional and statutory analysis in the field of discrimination
law. 
III. THE CONCEPT OF IMMUTABILITY
The concept of immutability has been a fixture in both constitu-
tional and statutory analysis of discrimination issues. This Part will
develop two different definitions of the term “immutable characteris-
tic,” both drawn from constitutional cases. The term can be defined
as (1) “an accident of birth”;135 or (2) a characteristic that is either
unchangeable in absolute terms or so fundamental to identity or
conscience that individuals effectively cannot and should not be
required to change it.136 This Article will explore the applicability of
each definition to the traits covered by the employment discrimina-
tion statutes and will argue that immutability is a unifying prin-
ciple that satisfactorily explains the protected classifications. 
A. Immutability in Constitutional Analysis
The Supreme Court has referred to the immutability of group
characteristics in resolving due process and equal protection ques-
tions. The Court has considered the immutability of characteristics
PSYCHOL. REV. 60, 61 (2010) (“[T]he unique characteristics of religion, including compelling
affective experiences and a moral authority that cannot be empirically disputed ... may lend
this particular social identity a personal significance exceeding that of membership in other
groups.”). 
134. See infra notes 180-85 and accompanying text for a discussion of circumstances in
which impairments and disabilities may to some extent be subject to individuals’ control.
135. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973).
136. In re Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 233-34 (B.I.A. 1985).
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in determining what level of scrutiny should apply to alleged acts of
discrimination.137 This Section will analyze the use and meaning of
the immutability concept in constitutional jurisprudence.
1. The Relevance of Immutability
The Supreme Court has suggested that identification of an
immutable characteristic, though not indispensable,138 can support
suspect class status and justify heightened scrutiny. In Frontiero v.
Richardson, for example, a Supreme Court plurality opinion as-
serted that “sex, like race and national origin, is an immutable
characteristic”139 and struck down federal statutes that treated male
and female spouses of military personnel unequally.140 
When the Supreme Court has specifically found that the attribute
at issue is not immutable, it has declined to apply heightened
scrutiny to challenged governmental actions. In Plyler v. Doe, which
involved a Texas statute that denied state funds to school districts
for the education of children who were illegal aliens, the Court noted
that undocumented status is not an immutable characteristic
because it is the product of intentional conduct.141 The Court there-
fore applied rational basis analysis rather than heightened scrutiny
to strike down the statute.142 In Lyng v. Castillo, the Court refused
to characterize the status of being close relatives as a suspect class
because close relatives “do not exhibit obvious, immutable, or dis-
tinguishing characteristics.”143 In that case, the Court used rational
basis analysis to uphold amendments to the Food Stamp Act that
disadvantaged certain families.144
Immutability, however, does not guarantee suspect class categori-
zation. In Frontiero, the Supreme Court identified disability and
137. See, e.g., Lyng v. Castillo, 477 U.S. 635, 638 (1986). See infra notes 143-44 and
accompanying text for further discussion of the case.
138. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971) (labeling aliens a suspect class
without mentioning immutability).
139. Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 686.
140. Id. at 690-91.
141. 457 U.S. 202, 220 (1982).
142. Id. (“It is ... difficult to conceive of a rational justification for penalizing these children
for their presence within the United States.”).
143. 477 U.S. 635, 638 (1986).
144. Id. at 639.
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intelligence as immutable but determined that they did not have
suspect class status because these attributes could actually affect an
individual’s competence and functioning.145 The Supreme Court
confirmed its view of mental impairments in City of Cleburne v.
Cleburne Living Center, Inc.146 The Court acknowledged the immu-
tability of mental retardation147 but refused to recognize individuals
who suffer from the condition as a suspect class.148 Likewise, in
Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia, the Supreme Court
declined to apply heightened scrutiny to evaluate the constitutional-
ity of a statute mandating a retirement age of fifty for state police
officers.149 The Court believed that older individuals, unlike those
subjected to discrimination based on race or national origin, are not
a discrete and insular minority and “have not experienced a ‘history
of purposeful unequal treatment.’”150
2. The Meaning of Immutability
The next step of analysis is to determine how the federal courts
define an “immutable characteristic.” A review of Supreme Court
and appellate court decisions reveals two primary definitions of
immutability. 
First, the Frontiero Supreme Court decision defined an immuta-
ble characteristic as one that is “determined solely by the accident
of birth.”151 Thus, immutable characteristics are not the product of
“conscious ... action.”152 In Vieth v. Jubelirer, the Court noted that
political affiliation is not an immutable characteristic because it
“may shift from one election to the next.”153 It is noteworthy that
Vieth is the only post-1986 instance in which the Supreme Court
145. Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 686.
146. 473 U.S. 432, 448 (1985) (using rational basis analysis to invalidate a zoning order
that required a special permit for a group home for mentally retarded individuals).
147. Id. at 442.
148. Id. at 442, 446.
149. 427 U.S. 307, 313-14 (1976) (finding that the mandatory retirement statute was
rationally related to the state’s legitimate public safety goals).
150. Id. at 313.
151. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973); see also Michael M. v. Superior
Court, 450 U.S. 464, 477-78 (1981) (Stewart, J., concurring) (referring to immutable
characteristics as those with which one is born).
152. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 220 (1982).
153. 541 U.S. 267, 287 (2004).
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analyzed the concept of immutability, and thus some scholars have
commented that it may be essentially extinct in Supreme Court
jurisprudence.154 However, the concept has been more frequently
contemplated by the appellate courts, and the definition of immuta-
bility as an “accident of birth” has been adopted by several of
them.155
The federal appellate courts have also developed a second under-
standing of the meaning of “immutable characteristic.” Under this
formulation, a trait is immutable if it is “so fundamental to the
identities or consciences of its members that members either cannot
or should not be required to change it.”156 In other words, a trait is
immutable if “changing it would involve great difficulty, such as
requiring a major physical change or a traumatic change of iden-
tity.”157 Thus, according to this approach, an attribute need not be
entirely fixed in order to be deemed immutable. 
154. Samuel A. Marcosson, Constructive Immutability, 3 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 646, 647 (2001)
(noting that the concept of immutability has receded in Supreme Court equal protection
analysis and may even be considered irrelevant); Marc R. Shapiro, Treading the Supreme
Court’s Murky Immutability Waters, 38 GONZ. L. REV. 409, 412 (2002-03) (asserting that the
Supreme Court appears interested in “phasing out the immutability concept”); Kenji Yoshino,
Assimilationist Bias in Equal Protection: The Visibility Presumption and the Case of “Don't
Ask, Don't Tell,” 108 YALE L.J. 485, 490-91 (1998) (criticizing the concept of immutability and
arguing for its demise in constitutional analysis).
155. See St. John’s United Church of Christ v. City of Chicago, 502 F.3d 616, 638 (7th Cir.
2007) (citing Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 686); Eulitt ex rel. Eulitt v. Me. Dep’t of Educ., 386 F.3d
344, 353 n.3 (1st Cir. 2004) (discussing the definition in a footnote); Lake v. Arnold, 112 F.3d
682, 687 (3d Cir. 1997) (citing Novotny v. Great Am. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 584 F.2d 1235,
1243 (3d Cir. 1978)).
156. Hernandez-Montiel v. INS, 225 F.3d 1084, 1093 (9th Cir. 2000); see also Zavaleta-
Lopez v. Att’y Gen., 360 F. App’x 331, 333 (3d Cir. 2010) (“[I]mmutable characteristics [are
those] such as race, gender, or a prior position, status, or condition, or characteristics that are
capable of being changed but are of such fundamental importance that persons should not be
required to change them, such as religious beliefs.”); Njenga v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 216 F. App’x
963, 996-67 (11th Cir. 2007) (finding that immutable characteristics are fundamental to
individual identities or consciences); In re Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 233-34 (B.I.A. 1985),
overruled on other grounds by In re Mogharrabi, 19 I. & N. Dec. 439, 447 (B.I.A. 1987). The
Zavaleta-Lopez case illuminates an evolution in the Third Circuit’s understanding of
immutability. In 1997, the court adopted the “accident of birth” definition of immutability in
Lake v. Arnold, 112 F.3d at 687, but thirteen years later in Zavaleta-Lopez, 360 F. App’x at
333, the court articulated a much broader conceptualization of the term.
157. Watkins v. U.S. Army, 875 F.2d 699, 726 (9th Cir. 1989) (Norris, J., concurring)
(holding that the U.S. Army could not bar a soldier’s reenlistment because of his
homosexuality).
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Professor Samuel Marcosson speaks of “self-concept,” which is a
“complex mix of cultural, familial, historical, and internal factors.”158
The second definition of immutability is sensitive to the importance
of self-concept and embraces the idea that certain characteristics
are core to an individual’s sense of self and thus must be deemed
unalterable.
One might object that the more liberal definition of immutability
defies the word’s literal meaning and thus should be rejected. This
Article would argue, however, that although traits such as religion
or pregnancy, which are captured by this definition, may appear
objectively mutable to some, they are immutable to others based on
their world view and identity. Thus, although to a secular individual
religion may appear alterable, pious adherents have martyred
themselves in order to avoid violating religious principles.159 To
many devout people conversion is unfathomable, and religious re-
quirements are divinely established. Professor Michael McConnell
acknowledged this reality when he wrote the following about
Sabbath-keeping Jews who do not work on Saturdays: “It would
come as some surprise to a devout Jew to find that he has ‘selected
the day of the week in which to refrain from labor,’ since the Jewish
people have been under the impression for some 3,000 years that
this choice was made by God.”160
Similarly, although it is objectively possible to plan or terminate
pregnancies, many individuals do not view these matters as being
within their power to decide. For some, family planning is reli-
giously prohibited, and abortion constitutes murder. To such
individuals, preventing or ending pregnancy, though readily
achievable through medical means, is inconceivable. Consequently,
stretching “immutability” to encompass traits that are fundamental
to identity is a reasonable approach. There are traits that are
objectively mutable but are, in practical terms, unchangeable to
158. Marcosson, supra note 154, at 683.
159. Robert M. Cover, Essay, Violence and the Word, 95 YALE L.J. 1601, 1603-05 (1986).
160. Michael W. McConnell, Religious Freedoms at a Crossroads, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 115,
125 (1992) (critiquing Justice O’Connor’s concurrence in Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc.,
472 U.S. 703 (1985), in which the Supreme Court held that a Connecticut statute that
required employers to accommodate employees’ Sabbath observance without exception
violated the Constitution).
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particular individuals because of their fundamental beliefs or self-
understanding. 
B. Immutability in the Employment Discrimination Statutes
Even if the concept of immutability is of limited importance in
contemporary Supreme Court constitutional analysis, it is illumi-
nating in the context of the employment discrimination statutes.
Both the courts and academic commentators have recognized
immutability as a central justification for the antidiscrimination
mandates that apply to the workplace.161
This Article argues that the notion of “immutable characteristics”
explains the protected classifications better than any other princi-
ple, especially after the enactment of GINA and the ADAAA. All of
the attributes protected by the employment discrimination laws can
be deemed to be immutable characteristics under one or both of the
definitions described above.162 
To be clear, this Article argues only that the concept of immuta-
bility provides a rationale for the protected classifications encom-
passed within the antidiscrimination statutes. It acknowledges that
the concept of immutability does not explain why certain unchange-
able or self-defining traits, such as sexual orientation and parental
161. See Earwood v. Cont’l Se. Lines, Inc., 539 F.2d 1349, 1351 (4th Cir. 1976) (holding that
an employer’s hair length regulation does not violate Title VII because “[h]air length is not
an immutable characteristic”); Willingham v. Macon Tel. Publ’g Co., 507 F.2d 1084, 1091 (5th
Cir. 1975) (holding that Title VII prohibits only discrimination based on “immutable
characteristics, such as race and national origin”); Baker v. Cal. Land Title Co., 507 F.2d 895,
897 (9th Cir. 1974) (holding that Title VII addresses discrimination based on characteristics
that “the applicant, otherwise qualified, ha[s] no power to alter”); Fagan v. Nat’l Cash
Register Co., 481 F.2d 1115, 1125 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (“Congress has said that no exercise of that
responsibility may result in discriminatory deprivation of equal opportunity because of
immutable race, national origin, color, or sex classification.”); Debbie N. Kaminer, Religious
Conduct and the Immutability Requirement: Title VII’s Failure To Protect Religious Employees
in the Workplace, 17 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 453, 454 (2010) (“The federal courts explicitly
distinguish between mutable and immutable traits—or status and conduct—when deciding
most Title VII cases. In doing so, the courts have routinely held that mutable traits are not
entitled to protection under Title VII, and plaintiffs seldom win in these cases.”); Roberts,
supra note 32, at 476-77 (“When invoked within antidiscrimination law, immutability stands
for the proposition that entities should not discriminate on the basis of traits that a person
did not choose and cannot change or control without serious cost. Not coincidentally, the
perceived immutability of race, sex, national origin, disability, and even age has been cited
as a reason for protecting those traits.”).
162. See supra Part III.A.2.
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status, are excluded from the statutory scope, and these exclusions
will be explored later in the Article.163 This Section analyzes how
each definition of immutability fits the employment discrimination
laws’ protected classifications.
1. Immutable Characteristics as Accidents of Birth
Many of the characteristics that are covered by the employment
discrimination laws are very obviously accidents of birth. Race,
color, national origin, genetic makeup, and many disabilities are
traits that individuals have from the moment they are born. Age is
also determined by birth date. Although sex can be changed, the
change requires complicated sex reassignment surgery, which is
very rarely undertaken.164 Therefore, sex can be labeled as deter-
mined by accident of birth in all but the most exceptional cases.
The courts have extended Title VII’s national origin protection to
discrimination based on foreign accents.165 Although no absolute
prohibition is established, the courts have required employers to
prove a business necessity defense for adverse decisions related to
foreign accents because accents are linked to one’s birthplace and
are immutable for many people. Thus, in Carino v. University of
Oklahoma Board of Regents, the Tenth Circuit held that a univer-
sity violated Title VII by demoting an employee who had been the
supervisor of a dental laboratory and had no job performance
problems related to his Filipino accent.166 In Fragante v. City of
Honolulu, the Ninth Circuit upheld the rejection of an applicant
whose heavy accent was likely to create communication difficulties
163. See infra Part IV.C.
164. According to one source, only one hundred to five hundred sex reassignment surgeries
are performed each year in the United States. L. Fleming Fallon Jr., Sex Reassignment
Surgery, HEALTHLINE.COM (2004), http://www.healthline.com/galecontent/sex-reassignment-
surgery. According to another source, up to one thousand sex reassignment surgeries are
performed annually in the United States, while hundreds of additional Americans undergo
the operation more cheaply abroad. Lynn Conway, How Frequently Does Transsexualism
Occur?, http://ai.eecs.umich.edu/people/conway/TS/TSprevalence.html (last visited Feb. 18,
2011) (estimating that by 2002 a total of fourteen thousand to twenty thousand U.S. residents
had undergone sex reassignment surgery). 
165. See Fragante v. City and County of Honolulu, 888 F.2d 591 (9th Cir. 1989), cert.
denied, 494 U.S. 1081 (1990); Carino v. Univ. of Okla. Bd. of Regents, 750 F.2d 815 (10th Cir.
1984).
166. Carino, 750 F.2d at 816, 819.
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in a job with significant public contact,167 but the court emphasized
that “[a]n adverse employment decision may be predicated upon an
individual’s accent when—but only when—it interferes materially
with job performance.”168
Other protected classifications are less comfortably categorized as
accidents of birth. Although many individuals remain members of
their religions of birth, a significant percentage of Americans
convert to a different religion or choose not to identify with any
religion at all.169 Title VII’s prohibition of religious discrimination
makes no distinction between individuals who never altered their
religious affiliation and those who have.170
Citizenship status, like religion, is alterable. The fact that an
alien has left her country of origin and is living in the United States
is a matter of choice. At the same time, citizenship status can be
considered an accident of birth to some extent because the eligibility
conditions and timing of naturalization are dictated by law.171 Thus,
legal immigrants must wait a number of years before becoming
citizens,172 whereas persons who are born in this country are
automatically citizens.173 It is noteworthy that IRCA does not
protect individuals who could be naturalized but choose not to apply
for citizenship within six months of becoming eligible for it.174
Finally, although many disabilities are conditions with which
people are born, some are products of adversity or risk-taking
behavior. Such disabilities, therefore, can develop long after birth
and are nevertheless covered by the ADA.175
167. Fragante, 888 F.2d at 598.
168. Id. at 596.
169. THE PEW FORUM ON RELIGION & PUB. LIFE, U.S. RELIGIOUS LANDSCAPE SURVEY 5
(2008), available at http://religions.pewforum.org/reports (finding that 28 percent of
Americans say they have left the religion with which they were raised and are either members
of a different religion or unaffiliated). 
170. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (2006) (defining the term “religion”).
171. U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs., Citizenship Through Naturalization,
http://www.uscis.gov/portal/site/uscis/menuitem (follow “Citizenship Through Naturalization”
hyperlink) (last visited Feb. 18, 2011). 
172. Id.
173. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“All persons born or naturalized in the United States ...
are citizens of the United States.”).
174. 8 U.S.C. § 1324b(a)(3)(B)(I).
175. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (defining “disability”).
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The idea that the law protects individuals based on characteris-
tics that are acquired by accident of birth is emotionally appealing
and compelling. This Article therefore retains “accident of birth” as
one of its alternative definitions of immutability.176 “Accident of
birth,” however, does not accurately describe several of the charac-
teristics that have been awarded protected status in employment
discrimination law. This definition alone is thus underinclusive and
requires supplementation. 
2. Immutable Characteristics as Unchangeable or Fundamental
to Identity
The second definition of “immutable characteristic” offers a more
comprehensive characterization of all of the traits that comprise the
protected classifications. The understanding of an immutable char-
acteristic as one “that either is beyond the power of an individual to
change or that is so fundamental to [individual] identity or con-
science” that it is effectively unalterable and “ought not be required
to be changed”177 accurately describes all of the traits that have been
elevated to protected status by the employment discrimination laws.
As demonstrated above, this more liberal definition is rooted in
court precedent and has been accepted by several circuits.178
Race, color, national origin, sex, age, genetic makeup, many disa-
bilities, and the citizenship status of those not eligible for natural-
ization are accidents of birth and cannot be changed.179 They thus
meet both definitions of “immutable characteristic.” 
Other traits are captured only by the second definition. A secu-
larist might deem religion to be alterable, but it is immutable in the
worldview of many devout individuals because it is fundamental to
their conscience or identity.180 Thus, the law prohibits employers
that are not religious entities from demanding that workers adhere
176. See supra text accompanying note 12.
177. In re Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 233-34 (B.I.A. 1985), overruled on other grounds by
In re Mogharrabi, 19 I. & N. Dec. 439, 447 (B.I.A. 1987).
178. See supra note 156 and accompanying text.
179. See supra Part III.B.1 (discussing which characteristics are accidents of birth and to
what extent certain traits can be changed). It should be noted, however, that individuals who
are of mixed ancestry may choose to identify as members of a particular population group and
not another, and thus may have some control over their racial or national identity.
180. See supra note 159 and accompanying text.
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to particular religious beliefs in order to obtain or retain employ-
ment.181 Likewise, it is possible to plan or terminate pregnancies,
but for particular individuals, doing so would violate core religious
or moral beliefs and thus would be unimaginable. Consequently, the
law prohibits employers from engaging in pregnancy-based
discrimination.182
The second definition of immutability also applies to unalterable
disabilities that are acquired through accidents or other misfortunes
after birth.183 Moreover, it applies in circumstances in which
individuals choose not to mitigate or eliminate disabilities. In some
cases, disabilities can be overcome through prosthetic devices,
surgeries, or other treatments.184 Certain individuals, however, may
reject opportunities to alter their disabilities, viewing them as
valued components of their identity. A well-known illustration is
provided by members of the deaf community who decline cochlear
implants because they cherish deaf culture and American Sign
Language.185 The deafness of such individuals would now be pro-
tected as a disability under the ADA because the statute no longer
requires that the question of disability be resolved in light of
mitigating measures.186 In effect, the statute has endorsed the
choice of individuals with disabilities who opt to remain in their
natural, unaltered state and has deemed penalizing such a choice
to be unacceptable.187 The ADA’s post-amendment approach is thus
consistent with an understanding of disability in such circum-
181. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2006) (prohibiting religious discrimination); see also id. §§
2000e-1(a), 2000e-2(e)(2) (creating exemptions for religious corporations, associations,
societies, and educational institutions and establishing that they are permitted to restrict
their hiring to members of a particular religion).
182. Id. § 2000e(k) (defining the terms “because of sex” or “on the basis of sex” to include
pregnancy).
183. See supra note 175 and accompanying text.
184. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 12102(4)(E)(i)(I)-(IV) (West Supp. 2010) (discussing mitigating
measures).
185. Cox, supra note 78, at 217-18; Bonnie Poitras Tucker, Deaf Culture, Cochlear
Implants, and Elective Disability, 28 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 6, 6-7 (1998).
186. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 12102(4)(E)(i)(I)-(IV) (stating that determinations regarding
disabilities shall be made without regard to mitigating measures and describing such
measures).
187. But see supra notes 77-78 and accompanying text (noting that the ADA is silent as to
whether individuals who choose not to mitigate disabilities will be entitled to reasonable
accommodation).
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stances as being potentially fundamental to one’s identity and
therefore an immutable characteristic.188
By significantly enlarging the scope of statutory protection based
on biological attributes to include genetic makeup and essentially
all nontransient physical and mental impairments,189 GINA and the
ADAAA make immutability more relevant than ever to the employ-
ment discrimination field. Each protected classification can be
described as a characteristic that is either unchangeable in absolute
terms or that can be effectively unalterable for reasons of identity
or fundamental beliefs.
3. Why Should Immutable Characteristics Be Protected?
Having identified immutability as the common theme in the
employment discrimination statutes, it is natural to ask why the
law would opt to protect unalterable traits. The answer is that the
antidiscrimination mandates promote the public policy goals of
fairness and, to a lesser degree, efficiency, and attempt to establish
appropriate incentives and disincentives for employer and employee
conduct.
The fairness or justice concerns are two-fold. First, common sense
dictates that it is unjust for workers to suffer ill consequences solely
because of traits with which they were born or that they cannot
modify. Employers operating behind a Rawlsian “veil of igno-
rance”190 would presumably embrace the antidiscrimination man-
dates in order to minimize the possibility that they themselves
would be subjected to discrimination because of particular unalter-
able attributes. Behind the hypothetical “veil of ignorance,” an
employer would not know whether she plays the role of decision
maker or worker nor which immutable characteristics she pos-
sesses. Thus, everyone would fear discrimination and welcome its
prohibition.191
188. See supra notes 156-60 and accompanying text (discussing the second definition of
“immutable characteristic”).
189. See supra Part I.B.
190. See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 118-23 (1999) (outlining the principles of
justice that hypothetical decision makers would choose were they operating behind a “veil of
ignorance”).
191. Id. at 132-33 (hypothesizing that decision makers would wish to maximize benefits
for the worst off in the hope of ensuring their own good outcomes if they themselves were to
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A second fairness concern relates to safeguarding the personal
autonomy of workers with respect to major life decisions. Absent the
antidiscrimination laws, employers would be free to make adverse
decisions based on a worker’s religion192 or pregnancy.193 Conse-
quently, employees might feel pressured to change their religious
identities or to time, avoid, or terminate pregnancies in order to
maximize job opportunities. Employment concerns would thus drive
personal decisions in a manner that modern American society
perceives as unjust and repugnant.194
In some cases, prohibiting discrimination based on immutable
characteristics may also serve efficiency. Employers who are blinded
by prejudice could refuse highly qualified candidates in favor of less
competent nonminorities. Such employers would compromise their
productivity and profitability because of bias and thus may actually
benefit economically from the antidiscrimination mandates. 
Nevertheless, the employment discrimination laws do not con-
sistently promote efficiency for all employers. Some employers are
required to provide reasonable accommodations that can be costly
or burdensome.195 Others are forced to abandon preferred employ-
ment policies or to hire minorities whose presence might motivate
customers to choose to do business elsewhere.196 In this sense the
laws may be seen as shifting costs from workers or public safety net
programs to employers.197 
The employment discrimination laws’ focus on immutable
characteristics, understood broadly to include traits that are theo-
retically alterable but fundamental to individual identity, estab-
lishes incentives and disincentives that advance the public policy
goals of justice and, to a more limited extent, efficiency. Employers
fare poorly one day).
192. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (2006) (defining the term religion); id. § 2000e-2(a)
(prohibiting employers from discriminating on the basis of religion).
193. See id. § 2000e(k) (defining the terms “because of sex” or “on the basis of sex” to
include pregnancy); id. § 2000e-2(a) (prohibiting employers from discriminating on the basis
of sex).
194. See Corbett, supra note 105, at 171 (noting that the determination that something is
morally wrong “often leads to either passage or consideration of a legal regulation designed
to prohibit or mitigate that wrong”).
195. See infra note 316 and accompanying text. But see Hoffman, supra note 30, at 335-36
(suggesting that the cost of many accommodations is minimal).
196. See supra notes 122-25 and accompanying text.
197. See infra Part V.C for further discussion of these issues.
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are prohibited from punishing applicants and employees for
possessing traits that are outside of their control or from pressuring
them to make critical decisions concerning religion or pregnancy
that might be psychologically or otherwise harmful. In addition, the
laws are designed to prevent employers from behaving in self-
defeating ways by making discriminatory personnel decisions that
will compromise their own success.
IV. IS IMMUTABILITY THE WHOLE ANSWER?
Scholars and advocates should accept the concept of immutability
as encompassing all of the traits that American employment dis-
crimination law actually protects. The concept does not, however,
explain why other traits that are unchangeable or fundamental to
personal identity are excluded from statutory coverage. Many
characteristics can be described as accidents of birth, unchangeable,
or fundamental to individual identity or conscience, and yet, they do
not enjoy protected status.
The American legal system generally permits employers a high
degree of autonomy to operate as they see fit.198 This approach
encourages entrepreneurs to pursue business enterprises, promising
that they are at liberty to build a workforce of their choice and
maximize their profitability, with only limited restrictions.199 The
law must, therefore, balance the goal of combating pernicious
discrimination against the goal of creating a hospitable environment
for American employers.200 It is only when particular choices are
perceived as sufficiently dangerous that legislatures opt to inter-
vene.201 In addition, legislative choices are influenced by lobbying,
interest groups, and those with strong political voices.202
198. Corbett, supra note 105, at 166. 
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. See id. at 162, 171-77 (discussing the factors that determine whether a characteristic
will be “covered by discrimination law” and the need to balance those factors against
“important goals favoring unregulated employer prerogative”).
202. Ann Southworth, Lawyers and the “Myth of Rights” in Civil Rights and Poverty
Practice, 8 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 469, 481 (1999) (indicating that civil rights lawyers engage in
a variety of activities, including “lobbying for beneficial legislation and regulations,
communicating with the press, organizing grass-roots campaigns and training clients seeking
to influence the implementation of government policies, ... and building coalitions and
bargaining with other interest groups”).
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The immutable characteristics that are not protected by the
employment discrimination statutes fall into three categories. First,
there are traits about which employers are unlikely to care and that
they probably do not wish to exclude from the workplace.203 Second,
there are instances in which workers and employers may disagree
about whether a particular characteristic falls into a protected
category, and the law provides no clear answer.204 Finally, there are
attributes that are undoubtedly unchangeable or fundamental to
identity and that are associated with discrimination but have not
been elevated to protected status for political or other reasons.205
This Part will explore each of the three categories of excluded
immutable characteristics. In so doing it will contemplate whether
these exclusions constitute rational choices or raise significant
questions about the coherence of employment discrimination law. 
A. Immutable Traits Not Generally Associated with              
Discrimination
The First Circuit once made the following sweeping assertion: “If
America stands for anything in the world, it is fairness to all, with-
out regard to race, sex, ethnicity, age, or other immutable character-
istics that a person does not choose and cannot change.”206 Neverthe-
less, many biological traits that are immutable are not addressed by
the employment discrimination statutes. Examples are height,207
203. See infra Part IV.A.
204. See infra Part IV.B.
205. See infra Part IV.C.
206. DeNovellis v. Shalala, 124 F.3d 298, 314 (1st Cir. 1997).
207. See Deborah L. Rhode, The Injustice of Appearance, 61 STAN. L. REV. 1033, 1088 (2009)
(noting that “[i]n 1977, Michigan became the first and still only state to prohibit appearance
discrimination in employment, by adding height and weight to the characteristics protected
by the Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act”). Height requirements, however, may be challenged
even under federal law if they are found to be a proxy for sex or national origin discrimination
or to have a disparate impact on particular minority groups. See Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433
U.S. 321, 329-31 (1977) (finding that the height requirement of 5’2” for State of Alabama
prison guards would exclude 33.29 percent of U.S. women between the ages of 18 and 79 but
only 1.28 percent of men in the same age range and therefore was sufficient to establish a
prima facie case of sex discrimination); United States v. Lee Way Motor Freight, Inc., 625
F.2d 918, 941-43 (10th Cir. 1979) (remanding on question of whether height requirement had
disparate impact on Hispanic applicants); Davis v. County of Los Angeles, 566 F.2d 1334,
1341-42 (9th Cir. 1977) (invalidating a height requirement for firefighters that had a
disparate impact on Mexican Americans and was found not to be job related), vacated as moot
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eye color,208 blood type,209 and left-handedness.210 Clearly, not all
unchangeable characteristics are or should be the subject of legis-
lative intervention. 
The physical traits listed above are ignored most probably
because employers are unlikely to care about them or to make
adverse decisions based on them. Generally, there is no motivation
for employers to consider these attributes, and excluding them from
the workplace would yield no advantage. Thus, in balancing the
competing goals of employer autonomy and worker protection,211
legislatures choose not to intervene with respect to characteristics
such as height, eye color, blood type, and left-handedness. It would
be unreasonable to crowd the code books with legislation addressing
these characteristics when the probability of bias based on these
traits is very low.
B. Judgments About What Is Fundamental to Identity
Title VII, like the ADA prior to its amendment,212 has generated
significant debate concerning the boundaries of its protected
classifications.213 In some cases, plaintiffs claim that particular
qualities or behaviors are fundamental to their identity even though
they cannot clearly be designated as “race,” “color,” “religion,” “sex,”
or “national origin.”214 These cases blur the Title VII margins, and
on other grounds, 440 U.S. 625 (1979).
208. See, e.g., Tracy v. Mount Ida Coll., No. 93-12248, 1995 WL 464909, at *2 n.3 (D. Mass.
Mar. 17, 1995) (describing a discrimination claim based on eye color as one not prohibited by
Title VII); Teri Morris, Note, States Carry Weight of Employment Discrimination Protection:
Resolving the Growing Problem of Weight Bias in the Workplace, 32 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 173,
204-06 (2010) (noting that, as a “physical characteristic,” eye color “has not risen to the level
of requiring legal discrimination protection”).
209. See Mary Anne Case, Lessons for the Future of Affirmative Action from the Past of the
Religion Clauses?, 2000 SUP. CT. REV. 325, 345-46 (noting that blood type does not have “the
sort of salience” in the United States “that leads to worrisome stereotypical categorizations”
and contrasting this observation with the importance of blood type in Japanese culture).
210. de la Torres v. Bolger, 610 F. Supp. 593, 597 (N.D. Tex. 1985) (finding that a left-
handed worker did not have a “statutorily cognizable impairment” under the Rehabilitation
Act of 1973).
211. See supra notes 198-202 and accompanying text.
212. See supra notes 26-31 and accompanying text (discussing the ADA’s controversial
definition of “disability”).
213. See infra notes 214-43 and accompanying text.
214. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2006) (listing Title VII’s protected classifications).
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courts have faced difficult decisions concerning the immutability
and protected status of such qualities. The courts’ decisions in these
cases seem to turn on the degree to which they perceive the
qualities or behaviors at issue as truly fundamental to identity
rather than as matters of choice and preference.
Several plaintiffs have challenged workplace policies that restrict
employees’ ability to wear hairstyles that are associated with ethnic
identity.215 In Rogers v. American Airlines, Inc., for example, the
plaintiff asserted that wearing corn rows “has been, historically, a
fashion and style adopted by Black American women, reflective of
cultural, historical essence of the Black women in American
society.”216 In Eatman v. United Parcel Service, Eatman wore dread-
locks because of his Nubian belief system and their “connection to
African identity and heritage.”217 Despite litigants’ claims that their
hairstyles were fundamental to their identities, the courts have held
that hairstyles can be modified and that employer grooming policies
that restrict them do not violate Title VII.218 
Nevertheless, in Rogers, the court noted that had the airline
banned Afros rather than corn rows, it may have violated Title VII
because Afro-textured hair is natural to African Americans and thus
constitutes an immutable characteristic.219 The hairstyle decisions
are clearly influenced by the concept of immutability and are rooted
in the courts’ sense that the styles at issue are matters of predilec-
tion.
A number of reported cases involve disputes concerning the reach
of Title VII’s “religion” classification. The term “religion” is gener-
ally defined very liberally in American jurisprudence and has been
interpreted to include nontraditional and nonorganized religions.220
215. Eatman v. United Parcel Serv., 194 F. Supp. 2d 256, 258-59 (S.D.N.Y. 2002); Rogers
v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 527 F. Supp. 229, 231 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); Carswell v. Peachford Hosp., No.
C80-222A, 1981 WL 224, at *2 (N.D. Ga. May 26, 1981).
216. Rogers, 527 F. Supp. at 231-32.
217. Eatman, 194 F. Supp. 2d at 259.
218. Id. at 262; Rogers, 527 F. Supp. at 232-33; Carswell, 1981 WL 224, at *3. See generally
Angela Onwuachi-Willig, Another Hair Piece: Exploring New Strands of Analysis Under Title
VII, 98 GEO. L.J. 1079, 1093-94, 1120-24 (2010) (arguing that Title VII’s “race” category
should include protection of black women’s hairstyles because their hair is physically different
from white women’s hair, and this difference is essentially immutable).
219. Rogers, 527 F. Supp. at 232.
220. See, e.g., Frazee v. Ill. Dep’t of Employment Sec., 489 U.S. 829, 834 (1989) (“[T]he Free
Exercise Clause does not demand adherence to a tenet or dogma of an established religious
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Courts have opted for this approach in order to avoid infringing
upon plaintiffs’ First Amendment rights.221 Thus, courts have found
“religion” to encompass Wicca,222 white supremacist beliefs,223 and
a spiritual faith in the power of dreams.224 However, in some cases,
plaintiffs allege that they have been discharged for deeply held
beliefs that are fundamental to their identity, but they are met with
resistance from the courts. When courts deem the plaintiffs’ views
to constitute political ideas or lifestyle choices rather than beliefs
that can be categorized as “religious,” they refuse to grant litigants
Title VII protection. For example, in Slater v. King Soopers, Inc., the
district court ruled against a plaintiff who was terminated after
organizing a Hitler rally, concluding that the Ku Klux Klan was not
a religion that falls under Title VII but rather was “political and
social in nature.”225 In Brown v. Pena, a case that was predictably
deemed to be frivolous, the court ruled against a plaintiff who
claimed he was subjected to discrimination because of his “religious”
belief that Kozy Kitten Cat Food was contributing to his state of
well-being and job performance.226 
A growing number of plaintiffs have filed cases that allege dis-
crimination based on gender identity or gender expression, which
attempt to stretch the meaning of the term “sex” under Title VII.227
sect.”); United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 185 (1965) (explaining that the term “religion”
includes beliefs that are “sincerely held” and that are, in an individual’s “own scheme of
things, religious”).
221. See Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 356 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring)
(asserting that efforts by the government to draw distinctions between religious and secular
beliefs would not be “compatible with the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment”).
222. Van Koten v. Family Health Mgmt., Inc., 955 F. Supp. 898, 902 (N.D. Ill. 1997)
(finding that Wicca is a religion for Title VII purposes). 
223. Peterson v. Wilmur Commc’ns, Inc., 205 F. Supp. 2d 1014, 1021-22 (E.D. Wis. 2002)
(finding that a white supremacist belief system called “Creativity” was a “religion” within
Title VII’s meaning). 
224. Toronka v. Cont’l Airlines, Inc., 649 F. Supp. 2d 608, 612 (S.D. Tex. 2009) (refusing
to dismiss a case in which the plaintiff alleged that he was subjected to discrimination
because of his belief in the power of dreams that was linked to his African heritage and was
religious in nature).
225. 809 F. Supp. 809, 810 (D. Colo. 1992); see also Bellamy v. Mason's Stores, Inc., 368 F.
Supp. 1025, 1026 (E.D. Va. 1973) (finding that the discharge of an employee for being a
member of a racially exclusive organization dedicated to anti-Semitism did not violate Title
VII).
226. 441 F. Supp. 1382, 1384-85 (S.D. Fla. 1977) (finding that “plaintiff ’s belief in pet food
does not qualify legally as a religion”), aff’d, 589 F.2d 1113 (5th Cir. 1979).
227. See DIANNE AVERY ET AL., EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS
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Gender identity refers to individuals’ own sense of their gender,
regardless of their sex at birth, and gender expression relates to
individuals’ choices of grooming and conduct that are commonly
associated with being masculine or feminine.228 While early case
decisions provided little hope for plaintiffs with nontraditional sex-
related claims,229 some recent courts have been more sympathetic to
such litigants.230 In Smith v. City of Salem, the Sixth Circuit held
that Title VII prohibited discrimination against a male firefighter
who was diagnosed with gender identity disorder and exhibited
“gender non-conforming behavior.”231 Several additional courts have
ruled in favor of transsexual plaintiffs,232 though other courts
continue to interpret the term “sex” more narrowly.233 Thus, not all
courts construe Title VII as encompassing only the anatomical,
biological characteristics of being male or female. The courts that
ON EQUALITY IN THE WORKPLACE 453 (8th ed. 2010).
228. Id. at 455.
229. Ulane v. E. Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081, 1084 (7th Cir. 1984) (holding that “Title VII
does not protect transsexuals”); Sommers v. Budget Mktg., Inc., 667 F.2d 748, 750 (8th Cir.
1982) (ruling that transsexualism is not included in Title VII); Holloway v. Arthur Andersen
& Co., 566 F.2d 659, 663 (9th Cir. 1977) (finding that Title VII does not extend to
discrimination against transsexuals). A transsexual is a person who changes his or her
physical sex. AVERY ET AL., supra note 227, at 456.
230. AVERY ET AL., supra note 227, at 453.
231. 378 F.3d 566, 575 (6th Cir. 2004).
232. See, e.g., Barnes v. City of Cincinnati, 401 F.3d 729, 737-38 (6th Cir. 2005) (upholding
a verdict for a preoperative male-to-female transsexual who alleged she was demoted from a
police officer job in violation of Title VII); Schroer v. Billington, 577 F. Supp. 2d 293, 308
(D.D.C. 2008) (holding that the Library of Congress violated Title VII by “refusing to hire
Diane Schroer because her appearance and background did not comport with the
decisionmaker’s sex stereotypes”).
233. See, e.g., Kastl v. Maricopa County Cmty. Coll. Dist., 325 F. App’x 492, 493 (9th Cir.
2009) (finding, based on insufficient evidence, that the employer did not violate Title VII by
prohibiting a preoperative transsexual from using the women’s restroom until after her sex
reassignment surgery was complete); Etsitty v. Utah Transit Auth., 502 F.3d 1215, 1221 (10th
Cir. 2007) (concluding that “discrimination against a transsexual based on the person's status
as a transsexual is not discrimination because of sex under Title VII”); see also Angela
Clements, Sexual Orientation, Gender Nonconformity, and Trait-Based Discrimination:
Cautionary Tales from Title VII & an Argument for Inclusion, 24 BERKELEY J. GENDER L. &
JUST. 166, 171 (2009) (“[E]ven though sex discrimination doctrine reaches some types of
discrimination against gender nonconforming people, courts have limited this doctrine,
especially outside of the sexual harassment context.”); Ann C. McGinley, Erasing Boundaries:
Masculinities, Sexual Minorities, and Employment Discrimination, 43 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM
713, 715 (2010) (“The problem of adequately protecting sexual minorities under Title VII lies
in the courts' binary view of sex and gender, a view that identifies men and women as polar
opposites and that sees gender as naturally flowing from biological sex.”).
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have ruled for nontraditional sex discrimination plaintiffs perceive
gender identity and expression as fundamental to individuals’ sense
of themselves. The clearest illustration of this view is provided by
a district court that compared transsexuality to religious conversion.
The court argued that just as Title VII prohibits discrimination
based on conversion from Christianity to Judaism, it prohibits
discrimination because a plaintiff feels compelled to change her
sex.234
Yet another area of controversy is English-only rules, which
prohibit employees from speaking languages other than English at
work. A number of commentators have asserted that language is an
integral part of cultural identity and that language rights fall under
the umbrella of national origin protection.235 Traditionally, courts
have tended to find that rules prohibiting employees from speaking
Spanish (or other languages) during work hours did not violate Title
VII so long as they did not apply during breaks or to employees who
spoke no English at all.236 Because bilingual employees can commu-
nicate in English, the courts viewed speaking a foreign tongue as a
choice and as conduct that could easily be controlled and altered by
workers.237 
In the last few years, however, the Tenth Circuit has required em-
ployers to prove business necessity to justify English-only rules.238
234. Schroer, 577 F. Supp. 2d at 306-07.
235. See Christopher David Ruiz Cameron, How the Garcia Cousins Lost Their Accents:
Understanding the Language of Title VII Decisions Approving English-Only Rules as the
Product of Racial Dualism, Latino Invisibility, and Legal Indeterminacy, 85 CAL. L. REV. 1347,
1353 (1997); Mark Colón, Line Drawing, Code Switching, and Spanish as Second-Hand
Smoke: English-Only Workplace Rules and Bilingual Employees, 20 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 227,
246-50 (2002); Juan F. Perea, Demography and Distrust: An Essay on American Languages,
Cultural Pluralism, and Official English, 77 MINN. L. REV. 269, 276-79 (1992); Bill Piatt,
Toward Domestic Recognition of a Human Right to Language, 23 HOUS. L. REV. 885, 896
(1986); L. Darnell Weeden, The Less than Fair Employment Practice of an English-Only Rule
in the Workplace, 7 NEV. L.J. 947, 953-55 (2007). But see Natalie Prescott, English Only at
Work, Por Favor, 9 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 445, 445-46 (2007) (arguing that “there are
important policy reasons to restrict individuals' ability to speak foreign languages at work”). 
236. See, e.g., Garcia v. Spun Steak Co., 998 F.2d 1480, 1483, 1489 (9th Cir. 1993); Garcia
v. Gloor, 618 F.2d 264, 266, 270-71 (5th Cir. 1980).
237. Spun Steak, 998 F.2d at 1487; Gloor, 618 F.2d at 270; see also James Leonard, Title
VII and the Protection of Minority Languages in the American Workplace: The Search for a
Justification, 72 MO. L. REV. 745, 745-46 (2007) (arguing that employers should retain
discretion to impose workplace language policies).
238. See Montes v. Vail Clinic, Inc., 497 F.3d 1160, 1171 (10th Cir. 2007); Maldonado v.
City of Altus, 433 F.3d 1294, 1306-07 (10th Cir. 2006).
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Thus, such rules are lawful only if the speaking of foreign languages
during work hours would cause communication problems in the
workplace or would otherwise be disruptive.239 The Tenth Circuit’s
approach is consistent with the EEOC Guidelines on Discrimination
Because of National Origin.240 By requiring a business necessity
defense, the Tenth Circuit shows sympathy for plaintiffs’ argument
that speaking their native tongue is central to their cultural identity
and deserves some level of Title VII protection.
The scope of Title VII’s protected classifications remains some-
what blurred at the margins. Plaintiffs have attempted to stretch
the meaning of the protected categories by claiming that specific
behaviors are immutable within their world view. Furthermore,
several scholars have argued that Title VII should be interpreted to
include ethnic, cultural, and gender identity traits or even be
amended so that the law includes these explicitly. Peter Brandon
Bayer argues that “all employment decisions, criteria, terms, con-
ditions, and opportunities that are premised on or implicate race,
color, religion, sex or national origin are discriminatory” and should
be deemed to violate Title VII.241 Bayer, therefore, asserts that Title
VII should be understood to extend to “grooming styles, attire, and
language.”242 Professor Juan Perea proposes that the words “ethnic
traits” be added to Title VII’s list of protected characteristics and
that the phrase be defined to include “language, accent, surname,
and ethnic appearance.”243 
The courts, however, have not consistently followed this liberal
path. A critique of these decisions and formulation of recommenda-
tions concerning the direction the courts should take with respect to
each of these issues is beyond the scope of this Article. For my
239. See Montes, 497 F.3d at 1171 (affirming summary judgment for employer because
“clear and precise communication between the cleaning staff and the medical staff was
essential in the operating rooms”); Maldonado, 433 F.3d at 1306-07 (reversing summary
judgment for the employer because there was scant evidence that use of Spanish by some
employees caused communication, morale, or safety problems).
240. 29 C.F.R. § 1606.7 (2010) (“An employer may have a rule requiring that employees
speak only in English at certain times where the employer can show that the rule is justified
by business necessity.”).
241. Peter Brandon Bayer, Mutable Characteristics and the Definition of Discrimination
Under Title VII, 20 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 769, 772 (1987).
242. Id. at 774.
243. Juan F. Perea, Ethnicity and Prejudice: Reevaluating “National Origin”
Discrimination Under Title VII, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 805, 860-61 (1994).
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purposes, it is important only to establish that the courts’ decisions
concerning the qualities and behaviors discussed in this Section
appear to depend on the degree to which the judges accept the
attributes as unchangeable or fundamental to personal identity as
opposed to perceiving them as purely matters of preference.
C. The Most Puzzling Exclusions
The protected classifications are a subset of immutable character-
istics that have been deemed to require legal intervention. As
discussed in previous sections, a variety of immutable traits, such
as height and eye color, are not covered because they are unlikely to
constitute reasons for discrimination.244 Others, such as speaking
foreign languages or transsexualism, are ambiguous in terms of
immutability and have led to inconsistent court decisions.245 But
several characteristics are plainly immutable, have historically
elicited discrimination, are generally irrelevant to job performance,
and yet are definitively excluded from statutory coverage. The
protection of these traits would be justified under all of the theories
of discrimination discussed in Part II, and their exclusion raises
serious questions about the coherence of federal employment dis-
crimination law. Five of these will be analyzed below: sexual orien-
tation, appearance, parental status, marital status, and political
affiliation.246
244. See supra Part IV.A.
245. See supra Part IV.B.
246. EEOC, ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE: UNLAWFUL DISPARATE TREATMENT OF WORKERS
WITH CAREGIVING RESPONSIBILITIES 2 (2007), available at http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/
caregiving.pdf (explaining that the federal employment statutes “do not prohibit discrim-
ination against caregivers per se”); EEOC, FACT SHEET: DISCRIMINATION BASED ON SEXUAL
ORIENTATION, STATUS AS A PARENT, MARITAL STATUS, AND POLITICAL AFFILIATION (2009),
available at http://www.eeoc.gov/federal/upload/otherprotections.pdf (discussing the Civil
Service Reform Act of 1978, which prohibits discrimination based on marital status or political
affiliation, and executive orders that prohibit discrimination based on sexual orientation and
parental status, all of which apply only to federal employees, and acknowledging that the
other federal employment discrimination statutes do not protect workers based on these
categories); Rhode, supra note 207, at 1048 (explaining that federal law does not prohibit
appearance discrimination).
Other categories could be added to the list as well. For example, arrest records are also
immutable, as is military service or lack thereof after a certain age, and both should be
irrelevant to job performance in most instances. See, e.g., WIS. STAT. § 111.321 (2007)
(prohibiting employment discrimination based on arrest record and military service, among
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1. Sexual Orientation
According to the federal courts and the EEOC, Title VII does not
prohibit employers from making adverse employment decisions
based on sexual orientation.247 Scientific research has not proven
conclusively whether sexual orientation is a biological trait that is
an accident of birth,248 but it seems always to be fundamental to
personal identity.249 Moreover, many homosexual individuals report
that they experience discrimination in the workplace.250 As of 2009,
twenty-one states and the District of Columbia had recognized the
severity of the problem and passed legislation to ban discrimination
based on sexual orientation.251 At the federal level, Congress has
repeatedly considered the Employment Non-Discrimination Act,
other characteristics). For the sake of brevity, however, I will address only the five categories
listed in the text above.
247. Simonton v. Runyon, 232 F.3d 33, 35-36 (2d Cir. 2000); AVERY ET AL., supra note 227,
at 453. The Supreme Court has determined, however, that Title VII does prohibit same-sex
sexual harassment. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 79 (1998).
Therefore, if a man sexually harasses another man in the workplace, the victim will have a
Title VII cause of action. By contrast, if an employer declines to hire an individual because
he is gay, the worker will have no federal law cause of action.
248. Clements, supra note 233, at 205-06 (“The biological origins of sexual orientation are
still being contested and researched.”); Nancy Levit, Theorizing and Litigating the Rights of
Sexual Minorities, 19 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 21, 54-55 (2010) (stating that the many studies
and “overwhelming evidence of the failure of conversion or ‘reparative’ therapy ... seems to
indicate a strong biological location for sexual orientation for gay men,” but that the evidence
is inconclusive for women).
249. Hernandez-Montiel v. INS, 225 F.3d 1084, 1093 (9th Cir. 2000) (“Sexual orientation
and sexual identity are immutable; they are so fundamental to one's identity that a person
should not be required to abandon them.”); In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 441 n.59 (Cal.
2008) (“[O]ne's sexual orientation defines the universe of persons with whom one is likely to
find the satisfying and fulfilling relationships that, for many individuals, comprise an
essential component of personal identity.” (quoting Brief of the American Psychological Ass’n
et al. in Support of Parties Challenging the Marriage Exclusion at 8, Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d
384 (No. S147999))). 
250. M. V. LEE BADGETT ET AL., WILLIAMS INST., BIAS IN THE WORKPLACE: CONSISTENT
EVIDENCE OF SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND GENDER IDENTITY DISCRIMINATION 2 (2007), available
at http://www.law.ucla.edu/williamsinstitute/publications/Bias%20in%20the%20Workplace
.pdf (discussing studies regarding employment discrimination experienced by the LGBT
community); DEBORAH J. VAGINS, ACLU, WORKING IN THE SHADOWS: ENDING EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION FOR LGBT AMERICANS 7 (2007), available at http://www.aclu.org/files/pdfs/l
gbt/enda_20070917.pdf. 
251. NAT’L GAY & LESBIAN TASK FORCE, STATE NONDISCRIMINATION LAWS IN THE U.S.
(2009), available at http://www.thetaskforce.org/downloads/reports/issue_maps/non_ discrimi
nation_7_09.pdf. 
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which would extend protected status to sexual orientation, but has
never passed it.252 The Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 and
Executive Order 13,087 are federal mandates that prohibit discrimi-
nation against gay individuals, but they apply only to federal
employees.253
2. Appearance
The employment discrimination statutes also fail to prohibit
appearance discrimination, and thus, employers may discriminate
with impunity against workers whom they consider less attractive
than others.254 Employers may well be motivated to make hiring
decisions based on appearance, if they believe that good-looking
employees will attract customers or clients.255 
Employees who are overweight are especially vulnerable to
discrimination in the workplace,256 and the courts have consistently
ruled that obesity alone (without associated medical problems) is
not a protected characteristic under the employment discrimination
252. See, e.g., Employment Non-Discrimination Act of 2009, H.R. 3017, 111th Cong. § 2(2)
(2009) (designed to prohibit “employment discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation or
gender identity”). 
253. 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(10) (2006) (prohibiting discrimination based on “conduct which does
not adversely affect the performance of the employee or applicant or the performance of
others”); Exec. Order No. 13,087, 63 Fed. Reg. 30,097 (May 28, 1998) (prohibiting discrim-
ination based on sexual orientation); U.S. OFFICE OF PERS. MGMT., ADDRESSING SEXUAL
ORIENTATION DISCRIMINATION IN FEDERAL CIVILIAN EMPLOYMENT: A GUIDE TO EMPLOYEE'S
RIGHTS 4 (1999), available at http://www.opm.gov/er/address2/Guide04.asp (interpreting the
term “conduct” in the Civil Service Reform Act to include sexual orientation). 
254. Corbett, supra note 105, at 153; Rhode, supra note 207, at 1035 (arguing that
“discrimination based on appearance is a significant form of injustice, and one that the law
should remedy”). Employers who use appearance as a proxy for race, national origin, or
disability, however, may be prosecuted for violation of the law.
255. See Rhode, supra note 207, at 1037-39 (discussing research concerning the importance
of appearance and explaining that attractive individuals are treated better in the workplace,
school, the criminal justice system, and other environments).
256. See Korn, supra note 67, at 220-23 (discussing the stigma of obesity); J.D. Latner et
al., Weighing Obesity Stigma: The Relative Strength of Different Forms of Bias, 32 INT’L J.
OBESITY 1145, 1150 (2008) (finding that “weight bias persists”); L.R. Vartanian, Disgust and
Perceived Control in Attitudes Toward Obese People, 34 INT’L J. OBESITY 1302, 1302 (2010)
(“Bias and discrimination against overweight and obese people is widespread, affecting
domains ranging from employment to romantic relationships.”); Wang, supra note 68, at 1910-
16 (discussing the “reality of weight discrimination” and studies that conclude that such
discrimination is pervasive).
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laws.257 Scientific research has revealed that obesity is a complex
condition that “involves the integration of social, behavioral, cul-
tural, physiological, metabolic and genetic factors.”258 Thus, obesity
can be considered immutable in the sense that it has biological
components and is very difficult if not impossible to overcome.259
Over 30 percent of Americans are obese,260 and most individuals
who diet fail to achieve permanent and significant weight reduc-
tions.261
Other aspects of appearance may also be immutable. Although
theoretically individuals might be able to change their look through
grooming choices or even surgical interventions, many may not
actually be able to do so because of financial constraints or because
their natural appearance is fundamental to their sense of self.262
Despite evidence of significant appearance-related inequities,263
such discrimination largely has been ignored by state and federal
law. To date, only Michigan and the District of Columbia have
passed state-level laws that ban appearance discrimination,264 and
257. See, e.g, Greenberg v. BellSouth Telecomms., Inc., 498 F.3d 1258, 1264-65 (11th Cir.
2007) (upholding summary judgment against an employee in part because obesity is rarely
a disability under the ADA); EEOC v. Watkins Motor Lines, Inc., 463 F.3d 436, 443 (6th Cir.
2006) (holding “that to constitute an ADA impairment, a person's obesity, even morbid
obesity, must be the result of a physiological condition”); Korn, supra note 67, at 230-35
(discussing the difficulty of proving that obesity is an impairment under the ADA, even after
the ADAAA’s enactment); see also supra notes 67-72 and accompanying text (concluding that
the ADAAA is unlikely to change litigation outcomes in obesity cases). 
258. Executive Summary of the Clinical Guidelines on the Identification, Evaluation, and
Treatment of Overweight and Obesity in Adults, 158 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 1855, 1855
(1998); see also A. Palou et al., Obesity: Molecular Bases of a Multifactorial Problem, 39 EUR.
J. NUTRITION 127, 136 (2000) (“The most common forms of human obesity depend on the
interaction of many genes ... environmental factors, behavioural habits and lifestyle.”).
259. See J.M. Friedman, Obesity in the New Millennium, 404 NATURE 632, 633 (2000)
(stating that “more than 90% of individuals who lose weight by dieting eventually return to
their original weight").
260. Katherine M. Flegal et al., Prevalence and Trends in Obesity Among US Adults, 1999-
2008, 303 JAMA 235, 238 (2010).
261. Friedman, supra note 259, at 633.
262. See generally Robert Post, Prejudicial Appearances: The Logic of American
Antidiscrimination Law, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1 (2000) (discussing appearance discrimination and
analyzing whether it should be covered by the employment discrimination laws).
263. See supra notes 254-60 and accompanying text.
264. D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 2-1401.02(22), 2-1402.11(a) (LexisNexis 2001) (prohibiting
discrimination based on personal appearance); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 37.2202(1)(a)-(b) (2006)
(prohibiting discrimination based on height and weight). 
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the category is absent from the otherwise liberal Civil Service
Reform Act that protects federal employees.265
3. Parental Status
Parenthood is lifelong and, for many years, a dominant factor in
peoples’ lives, but it is addressed only to a very limited extent by
federal law.266 The Family Medical Leave Act provides that employ-
ers with fifty or more employees must allow eligible workers twelve
weeks of unpaid leave annually for childbirth, adoption, or to care
for an immediate family member with a serious illness.267 In addi-
tion, mothers who can show that, unlike fathers, they are disadvan-
taged in the workplace may be able to prove sex discrimination
under Title VII, but their ability to prevail will depend upon proof
of sex stereotyping or the presence of similarly situated male
comparators.268 The employment discrimination statutes do not in-
clude a general nondiscrimination mandate against parental status
discrimination. 
Employees, especially women, are justified in worrying that
having children may affect their employment prospects. Significant
literature has documented the so-called “maternal wall” that blocks
mothers’ career paths.269 Likewise, men who are known to be active
265. 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b) (2006).
266. See supra note 246 (discussing lack of protection for caregivers). Title VII’s prohibition
of pregnancy discrimination does not extend to parental status discrimination. 42 U.S.C. §
2000e(k). See generally Joan C. Williams & Nancy Segal, Beyond the Maternal Wall: Relief for
Family Caregivers Who Are Discriminated Against on the Job, 26 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 77, 102-
10 (2003) (discussing the applicability of a variety of legal theories to discrimination against
family caregivers).
267. 29 U.S.C. §§ 2611(4), 2612(a). Eligible employees are those who have been employed
for at least twelve months and have worked at least 1250 hours during that time. Id. §
2611(2)(A).
268. Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542, 544 (1971) (asserting that Title VII
does not permit “one hiring policy for women and another for men—each having pre-school-
age children”); Chadwick v. Wellpoint, Inc., 561 F.3d 38, 43-45 (1st Cir. 2009) (emphasizing
that Title VII “does not prohibit discrimination based on caregiving responsibility,” but that
the statute is violated “when an employer takes an adverse job action on the assumption that
a woman, because she is a woman, will neglect her job responsibilities in favor of her
presumed childcare responsibilities”).
269. See generally Stephen Benard, In Paik & Shelley J. Correll, Cognitive Bias and the
Motherhood Penalty, 59 HASTINGS L.J. 1359, 1368-77 (2008) (presenting evidence that
mothers suffer discrimination in the workplace); Shelley J. Correll, Stephen Benard & In
Paik, Getting a Job: Is There a Motherhood Penalty?, 112 AM. J. SOC. 1297, 1316 & tbl.1
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caregivers have been found to face barriers in the workplace.270 In
2006, the Center for WorkLife Law at the University of California
Hastings College of Law issued a report finding a 400 percent in-
crease in the number of discrimination cases involving family res-
ponsibilities filed in federal courts during the preceding decade.271
Of the cases, women filed 92 percent, and men filed 8 percent.272
Female employees won approximately 53 percent of the time, and
employers prevailed in 47 percent of the cases studied.273
Although evidence suggests that the problem is not trivial, only
a handful of state statutes establish a clear ban on parental status
discrimination.274 In addition, federal employees enjoy protection
under an executive order forbidding discrimination based on status
as a parent.275 It is possible that the lack of more comprehensive
legal protections can be explained by concern that a truly meaning-
ful antidiscrimination mandate to protect parents would involve a
reasonable accommodation requirement that would place additional
(2007); Faye J. Crosby, Joan C. Williams & Monica Biernat, The Maternal Wall, 60 J. SOC.
ISSUES 675, 676-77 (2004). 
270. Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 653 (1975) (finding that the Social Security
Act’s denial of surviving spouse benefits to widowed husbands was based on the false
assumption that only women would stay home to care for children, and thus that it violated
the Due Process Clause); Victoria L. Brescoll & Eric Luis Uhlmann, Attitudes Toward
Traditional and Nontraditional Parents, 29 PSYCHOL. WOMEN Q. 436, 443 (2005) (documenting
“prejudice against stay-at-home fathers,” though not focusing specifically on workplace
issues); Joan C. Williams & Stephanie Bornstein, The Evolution of “FReD”: Family
Responsibilities Discrimination and Developments in the Law of Stereotyping and Implicit
Bias, 59 HASTINGS L.J. 1311, 1330-31 (2008).
271. MARY C. STILL, CTR. FOR WORKLIFE LAW, LITIGATING THE MATERNAL WALL: U.S.
LAWSUITS CHARGING DISCRIMINATION AGAINST WORKERS WITH FAMILY RESPONSIBILITIES 2
(2006), available at http://www.worklifelaw.org/pubs/FRDreport.pdf. Most cases were filed
under Title VII. Id. at 5.
272. Id. at 8 & tbl.1.
273. Id. at 13 & tbl.6. It is unclear whether employers prevailed because the alleged
discrimination was found to be outside the statutory scope or because no discrimination was
found.
274. ALASKA STAT. § 18.80.220(a)(1) (2008) (forbidding parental status discrimination);
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46a-60(a)(9) (2009) (prohibiting employers from seeking information
concerning individuals’ reproductive functions or familial responsibilities); D.C. CODE ANN.
§§ 2-1401.01, .02(12), .11(a) (LexisNexis 2008 & Supp. 2010) (prohibiting discrimination based
on family responsibilities); N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 4A:7-3.1(a) (2010) (banning discrimination
based on familial status).
275. Exec. Order No. 13,152, 65 Fed. Reg. 26,115 (May 2, 2000).
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burdens on employers and meet resistance from the business
community.276
4. Marital Status 
Another attribute that would seem to be an appropriate candidate
for legal protection but is ignored by the federal antidiscrimi-
nation statutes is marital status.277 Although marital status, like
religion, can be changed, it is fundamental to individual identity.
Furthermore, undoubtedly, society would not want its members to
make decisions about marriage or divorce that are primarily rooted
in employment-related concerns.
Some studies have found pay discrepancies favoring married
employees over single employees.278 Other surveys have found that
unmarried workers feel stigmatized as immature and unstable or
believe they face more stringent work demands than married
coworkers.279
At the same time, married individuals may also be disadvantaged
in the workplace. A common form of marital status discrimination
is the no-spouse rule.280 Many employers institute policies under
which they refuse to employ both members of a married couple.281
While employers may design such a policy to avoid favoritism, it can
276. See Peggie R. Smith, Accommodating Routine Parental Obligations in an Era of Work-
Family Conflict: Lessons from Religious Accommodations, 2001 WIS. L. REV. 1443, 1492
(arguing that “employers should be required to provide reasonable accommodations for
routine parental obligations that conflict with work”); Williams & Bornstein, supra note 270,
at 1321-26 (analyzing whether reasonable accommodation is an appropriate model to combat
caregiver discrimination). 
277. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2006); Rutenschroer v. Starr Seigle Commc’ns, Inc., No. 05-
00364, 2006 WL 1554043, at *10 (D. Haw. May 31, 2006); Nicole Buonocore Porter, Marital
Status Discrimination: A Proposal for Title VII Protection, 46 WAYNE L. REV. 1, 7 (2000). 
278. Bella M. DePaulo & Wendy L. Morris, The Unrecognized Stereotyping and
Discrimination Against Singles, 15 CURRENT DIRECTIONS PSYCHOL. SCI. 251, 252 (2006)
(“Single men are paid less than their married male colleagues even when they are of similar
age and have comparable work experience.”); Robert K. Toutkoushian et al., The Interaction
Effects of Gender, Race, and Marital Status on Faculty Salaries, 78 J. HIGHER EDUC. 572, 573-
75 (2007).
279. Wendy J. Casper et al., Beyond Family-Friendly: The Construct and Measurement of
Singles-Friendly Work Culture, 70 J. VOCATIONAL BEHAV. 478, 481-82 (2007).
280. Chen v. County of Orange, 116 Cal. Rptr. 2d 786, 796-98 (Ct. App. 2002); Porter, supra
note 277, at 4.
281. Porter, supra note 277, at 4-5.
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create career crises for some engaged or married couples. Thus, if
two coworkers subject to a no-spouse rule choose to marry, one must
find a different job. 
Marital status has been the subject of state court employment
discrimination litigation in many instances.282 In one reported case,
an employer terminated an employee upon discovering that the
worker was living with a girlfriend whom he did not marry.283
Another employer refused to hire an individual who was unmarried
and pregnant.284 In a third case, an employer discharged a married
man who was having an affair even though, under company policy,
unmarried employees who engaged in promiscuous sexual relation-
ships would not be fired.285
Twenty-one states and the District of Columbia have state stat-
utes that prohibit marital status discrimination, though state courts
have interpreted the extent of the laws’ protection differently.286 In
addition, the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 prohibits the federal
government from discriminating against public employees based on
marital status.287 The absence of this category from the federal
antidiscrimination statutes that apply to nonfederal workers may
thus seem surprising.
5. Political Affiliation
For some people, political affiliation is as personally defining as
religion (if not more so), yet it too is left outside the scope of the
employment discrimination statutes.288 Title VII’s prohibition of
religious discrimination may appear natural because it reinforces
the value of religious freedom, rooted in the First Amendment.289
282. Chen, 116 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 796-800 (discussing a large number of cases involving
alleged marital status discrimination).
283. Johnson v. Porter Farms, Inc., 382 N.W.2d 543, 546 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986).
284. Cooper v. Mower County Soc. Servs., 434 N.W.2d 494, 498 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989).
285. Slohoda v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 475 A.2d 618, 619 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1984).
286. Porter, supra note 277, at 5, 15-16 (citing state statutes). Porter also analyzes whether
various state statutes apply to no-spouse rules. Id. at 17-22.
287. 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(1)(E) (2006).
288. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a).
289. Jane Rutherford, Equality as the Primary Constitutional Value: The Case for Applying
Employment Discrimination Laws to Religion, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 1049, 1085-86 (1996) (“The
Free Exercise Clause was meant, in part, to protect religious minorities from
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However, the Supreme Court has recognized a similar link between
political affiliation and freedom of assembly, also guaranteed by the
First Amendment.290 In an environment of political divisiveness and
discord, it is entirely possible that employers will take adverse
action against workers because of their political viewpoints or
allegiances.291 
Congress has already acknowledged the potential for harm and
included “political affiliation” among the protected categories for
federal employees in the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978.292 At the
state level, however, only New York and the District of Columbia
prohibit discrimination based on political affiliation.293 Therefore,
the vast majority of American workers still face the possibility of
adverse employment decisions due to their political viewpoints.
V. THE IMPLICATIONS OF IMMUTABILITY
Immutability is the common thread that runs through the fabric
of the employment discrimination statutes. By contrast, the concept
of immutability fails to elucidate the exclusion of categories that
appear ripe for protected status. This Part analyzes the usefulness
of the concept of immutability and the questions it raises about the
coherence of the employment discrimination statutory scheme. It
also briefly explores whether immutability is informative with
respect to the laws’ reasonable accommodation requirement and its
limitations.
discrimination.”).
290. Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 372-73 (1976).
291. Rutan v. Republican Party of Ill., 497 U.S. 62, 65 (1990) (involving various political
patronage practices concerning the promotion, transfer, recall, and hiring of low-level public
employees and determining that it is unconstitutional for these employment decisions to be
“based on party affiliation and support”); Cynthia Grant Bowman, “We Don’t Want Anybody
Anybody Sent”: The Death of Patronage Hiring in Chicago, 86 NW. U. L. REV. 57, 59-64 (1991)
(discussing the history of patronage hiring in Chicago and elsewhere).
292. 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(1)(E).
293. D.C. CODE ANN. § 2-1402.11(a) (LexisNexis 2008 & Supp. 2010); N.Y. LAB. LAW § 201-
d(2)(a) (McKinney 2009 & Supp. 2010).
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A. Immutability as the Rationale for Protected Status
Immutable characteristics can be defined either as: (a) accidents
of birth, or (b) traits that are unchangeable or so fundamental to
conscience or personal identity that they are effectively unalterable
for individuals and should not have to be changed.294 If both
meanings of the term are taken into account, immutability is a
unifying principle that explains the diverse characteristics that
the employment discrimination laws protect. Race, color, national
origin, sex, pregnancy, religion, age, disability, genetic information,
and citizenship status are all immutable under one or both of the
word’s definitions.
Immutability, however, is not the sole factor that explains the
choices American employment discrimination law has made.
Clearly, not all immutable characteristics are protected by the
statutes.295 Nevertheless, beyond immutability, a single rationale is
impossible to discern. The protected classifications appear to be
animated by a combination of theories.
A history of discrimination justifies protection of some groups,
including religious, racial, and ethnic minorities, and by extension
noncitizens, as well as women, older workers, and those with some
but not all disabilities.296 By contrast, the enactment of GINA was
not motivated by a recorded history of discrimination, but rather, by
fear of future discrimination based on genetic information.297 
The remainder of the protected classifications can be justified
by reference to fairness concerns and practical considerations.
Nonminorities are permitted to file reverse discrimination cases
under Title VII298 because it would be inequitable for the law to
prohibit discrimination by whites against blacks and men against
women but to tolerate it when the roles of perpetrator and victim
are reversed.299 In addition, it would likely be very difficult to draw
294. See supra notes Part III.A.2.
295. See supra Part IV.
296. See supra notes 82-96 and accompanying text; see also Hoffman, supra note 56, at
1253-54 (discussing the history of discrimination against people with particular disabilities).
297. See supra notes 99-101 and accompanying text.
298. McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 280 (1976).
299. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 801 (1973) (“Title VII tolerates no
racial discrimination, subtle or otherwise.”).
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a bright line separating ethnic groups that have suffered a history
of discrimination in the United States from those that have not.300
Post-ADAAA, the ADA, like Title VII, is very inclusive in its
scope of coverage,301 but the expansion of the statutory scope did not
result from the conviction that an increased number of impairments
are associated with a history of discrimination. Rather, experience
had shown that a definition of “disability” that could be interpreted
narrowly left plaintiffs with serious conditions, such as cancer
and mental retardation, without a remedy for discrimination.302
Consequently, the ADAAA significantly reduced courts’ discretion
with respect to determining disability status and opted to cover all
physical and mental impairments other than those that are minor
and transitory, lasting less than six months.303 This definition is
meant to prevent courts from focusing on the question of which
plaintiffs deserve the ADA’s protection and to provide a “clear and
comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of discrimina-
tion.”304 
Immutability is the only unifying principle that explains the
employment discrimination statutes’ protected classifications.
Beyond immutability, the statutory choices can be explained by a
combination of a history of discrimination, fear of future discrim-
ination, fairness concerns, pragmatic considerations, and political
influences. 
B. Immutability as a Liberalizing Force
Although immutability provides a reliable rationale for the
protected categories, the concept does not illuminate why other
characteristics that are equally unalterable or central to personal
300. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 295 (1978) (stating that “[t]he
concepts of ‘majority’ and ‘minority’ necessarily reflect temporary arrangements and political
judgments” and that “the white ‘majority’ itself is composed of various minority groups, most
of which can lay claim to a history of prior discrimination at the hands of the State and
private individuals”).
301. See supra Part I.B.2.b.
302. See ADAAA, Pub. L. No. 110-325, § 2(a)(3), 122 Stat. 3553, 3553 (2008) (stating that
Congress’s expectation of broad coverage under the ADA had not been fulfilled); supra notes
28-30, 56 and accompanying text.
303. 42 U.S.C. § 12102 (2006 & Supp. 2010) (revising the ADA’s definition of “disability”);
see supra Part I.B.2.b (discussing the ADA’s broad coverage).
304. ADAAA § 2(b)(1), (5), 122 Stat. at 3554 (explaining the purposes of the ADAAA).
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identity are disregarded by the federal statutes. This Article has
extensively discussed the examples of sexual orientation, appear-
ance, marital and parental status, and political affiliation.305 All of
these are immutable under at least one of the term’s definitions,306
and none is generally relevant to job performance.307 Furthermore,
history reveals a record of discrimination with respect to each
category,308 and employers may well be tempted to discriminate
based on all of these attributes.309
Under the current legal regime, employers are prohibited from
discriminating against individuals whose “religious beliefs” include
white supremacy,310 but are permitted to discriminate against
workers because they are homosexual or obese.311 There is no logical
justification for this discrepancy other than a lack of political will
to include these traits within the employment discrimination
scheme.312 
The passage of GINA and the ADAAA should occasion a reevalua-
tion of the limitations of the antidiscrimination statutes’ protected
characteristics. GINA and the ADAAA breathe new life into the
theory of immutability because both grant protected status to indi-
viduals based on generally unchangeable characteristics. Moreover,
the new additions appear to protect the traits at issue only because
they are immutable. Genetic makeup and many disabilities are not
necessarily associated with a history of discrimination and are not
305. See supra Part IV.C.
306. See supra Part III.A.2.
307. See supra Part II.B (analyzing the validity of the theory that the employment
discrimination laws prohibit consideration of traits that are irrelevant to job performance).
308. See supra Part IV.C.
309. Supra Part IV.C.
310. See supra note 223 and accompanying text.
311. See supra notes 67-70, 252 and accompanying text
312. Julie A. Baird, Playing It Straight: An Analysis of Current Legal Protections To
Combat Homophobia and Sexual Orientation Discrimination in Intercollegiate Athletics, 17
BERKELEY WOMEN’S L.J. 31, 66 (2002) (“Until the political and social climate becomes more
tolerant and accepting, lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgendered individuals remain in
jeopardy every day.”); J. Eric Oliver & Taeku Lee, Public Opinion and the Politics of Obesity
in America, 30 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 923, 925 (2005) (reporting results of a survey that
found that “as of 2001, most Americans were still not concerned with obesity, were less likely
to support most obesity-related policies such as taxing snack foods, and did not approve of
treating obesity as a physical disability,” and that “[m]ost Americans viewed obesity primarily
as a case of individual moral failure rather than the result of the food environment or
genetics”).
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always irrelevant to job performance, so their protected status is not
justified by other traditional theories of discrimination law.313 By
enacting GINA and the ADAAA, Congress has shown a willingness
to revisit and expand the employment discrimination laws.314 These
laws, therefore, could galvanize support for inclusion of other im-
mutable characteristics as protected classifications. 
Some advocates believe that the concept of immutability is ex-
cessively rigid and that reliance on it will prevent liberalization
of the employment discrimination statutes.315 However, if immut-
ability is understood to encompass not only traits that are
unchangeable in absolute terms, but also those that are so funda-
mental to personal identity that they are, in practical terms,
unalterable for certain individuals, the concept of immutability may
instead compel the addition of new protected classifications, such as
sexual orientation, parental status, and others. 
No cohesive theory can rationalize the employment discrim-
ination laws’ exclusion of essentially unalterable characteristics that
are irrelevant to job performance and because of which workers are
known to suffer discrimination. A more complete understanding of
the concept of immutability, as developed in this Article, and the
recent rejuvenation of immutability by GINA and the ADAAA could
spur a reconsideration and expansion of the covered categories. 
C. Immutability and Reasonable Accommodation
The concept of immutability also explains the employment dis-
crimination statutes’ apparent ambivalence about the requirement
of reasonable accommodation. The duty of “reasonable accommoda-
tion” refers to the mandate that employers refrain from excluding
protected class members even when hiring or retaining them may
313. See supra notes 99-101, 112-113 and accompanying text.
314. See supra notes 1-4 (noting that these laws were enacted as recently as 2008). 
315. See Bayer, supra note 241, at 771-72 (arguing against mutability analysis); Kenji
Yoshino, Covering, 111 YALE L.J. 769, 779 (2002) (criticizing the immutability requirement
of antidiscrimination law because it suggests that “the only acceptable defense to a demand
for assimilation is the inability to accede to it”); Roberto J. Gonzalez, Note, Cultural Rights
and the Immutability Requirement in Disparate Impact Doctrine, 55 STAN. L. REV. 2195, 2221-
22 (2003) (proposing that “the ‘immutability requirement’ be replaced by a dramatically
reduced threshold for establishing ‘adversity’” in order to enhance cultural rights under Title
VII).
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cause the employer to absorb significant cost or inconvenience.316 If
the employment discrimination laws protect characteristics that are
accidents of birth, unchangeable, or fundamental to the employee’s
identity,317 then they address traits for which employers bear no
responsibility. Consequently, it is somewhat uncomfortable for the
law to demand that employers expend considerable money or
tolerate significant inconvenience in order to accommodate employ-
ees’ needs.
Evidence of Congress’s ambivalence pervades employment dis-
crimination law. The only explicit requirements for reasonable
accommodation relate to religion and disability,318 and both of these
are qualified. Employers need not bear more than a de minimis
burden to accommodate religious needs319 and can assert an undue
hardship defense to limit their duty of reasonable accommodation
under the ADA.320 Notably, the ADAAA did not heed calls to revisit
the reasonable accommodation provision and elucidate its scope.321
By denying reasonable accommodations to individuals who are only
regarded as disabled, the ADAAA also made it more difficult for
plaintiffs seeking reasonable accommodations to prove disability
status than it is for those alleging discrimination in the form of
other adverse employment decisions.322 As previously discussed,
additional employment discrimination principles, such as the cause
of action for disparate impact and the rejection of a customer
preference defense, also embody what are essentially reasonable
accommodation requirements, but these are disguised and inex-
plicit.323 
The legislature’s uneasiness is understandable. The reasonable
accommodation requirement is an unfunded mandate that shifts the
316. See supra notes 112-27 and accompanying text.
317. See supra Part III.A.2.
318. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e(j), 12112(b)(5)(A) (2006).
319. Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 83-84 (1977).
320. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A).
321. See Steven B. Epstein, In Search of a Bright Line: Determining When an Employer’s
Financial Hardship Becomes “Undue” Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 48 VAND.
L. REV. 391, 478 (1995) (calling upon Congress or the EEOC to “move swiftly and aggressively
to create a highly transparent and highly accessible standard”); Long, supra note 53, at 228-
29.
322. ADAAA, Pub. L. No. 110-325, § 6(h), 122 Stat. 3553, 3558 (2008); see supra notes 74-76
and accompanying text.
323. See supra notes 117-25 and accompanying text.
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cost of addressing difficulties associated with employees’ immutable
characteristics to employers.324 Moreover, the burden is unequally
distributed because some employers, by chance, will have multiple
applicants or employees with disabilities or religious needs, and
some will have none.325 Employers have little control over the onus
they will bear to comply with this legal obligation, and its extent
will not be linked to any fault or misconduct on their part. 
Fortunately, as I have shown in previous work, employers are in
fact providing reasonable accommodations to individuals with
disabilities.326 In one large study, Susanne Bruyère of Cornell
University’s School of Industrial and Labor Relations found that
over 93 percent of private employers stated that they had made at
least one accommodation for an employee, and over half had imple-
mented multiple measures to accommodate workers with disabili-
ties.327 Minnesota and Maryland state agencies file annual reports
of ADA accommodations, indicating that they grant the vast
majority of requests.328 Research has shown that the direct costs of
accommodations average a few hundred dollars, which is affordable
for most employers.329
Much less evidence is available with respect to reasonable
accommodation of religious needs. However, a 1997 survey of fifty-
five Fortune 1000 companies found that 91 percent reported that
they accommodate employees’ religious needs, such as holiday
324. See Issacharoff & Nelson, supra note 109, at 317-18.
325. Id. at 340-41, 344.
326. See Hoffman, supra note 30, at 319-26. 
327. SUSANNE M. BRUYÈRE ET AL., COMPARATIVE STUDY OF WORKPLACE POLICY AND
PRACTICES CONTRIBUTING TO DISABILITY NONDISCRIMINATION 6, 11 (2004), available at
http://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/edicollect/104.
328. See MINN. MGMT. & BUDGET, 2009 ADA ANNUAL REPORT SUMMARY STATE OF
MINNESOTA EXECUTIVE BRANCH AGENCIES 6, available at http://www.mmb.state.mn.us/doc/
ada/2009AnnualReport.pdf (indicating that 84 percent of requests for accommodation were
granted and 5 percent were modified in 2009); 2009 MD. DEP’T OF BUDGET & MGMT. ANN.
STATEWIDE EQUAL OPPORTUNITY REP. 4, available at http://dbm.maryland.gov/eeo/Documents/
Publications/annual_eeo_rpt_fy2009.pdf (indicating that 88 percent of requests for accom-
modation were granted). 
329. See Hoffman, supra note 30, at 335-36 (noting that the studies do not address indirect
costs such as “potential absenteeism problems or increased health insurance costs”).
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observance.330 Fifty-seven percent claimed to allow leaves for
religious work, including missions.331 
The concept of immutability elucidates that the employer’s duty
of reasonable accommodation arises because of traits that are
accidents of birth or otherwise unalterable and not because of any
wrong committed by the employer. Consequently, it is natural for
the law to limit the degree of responsibility placed on employers.
This is not to say that the needs of individuals with disabilities
should be disregarded. As other commentators have suggested, the
government must do its share to support these workers. This
support can come in the form of increased tax incentives for
employers who hire individuals with disabilities,332 improved health
care coverage to enhance the functionality of those with impair-
ments,333 and other measures.
CONCLUSION
Although the concept of immutability may have fallen out of favor
in the realm of Supreme Court constitutional analysis,334 it deserves
renewed attention in the field of employment discrimination.
Immutability, understood broadly to include traits that are so
fundamental to personal identity that they are effectively unalter-
able for some individuals and should not have to be changed for
employment purposes,335 is a unifying principle that accurately
describes all of the antidiscrimination statutes’ protected classifica-
tions. However, if one moves the focus to traits that are excluded
from statutory coverage and attempts to understand the rationale
for some of these omissions, one can only conclude that this coun-
try’s employment discrimination framework is somewhat illogical
and incoherent.336
330. Karen C. Cash & George R. Gray, A Framework for Accommodating Religion and
Spirituality in the Workplace, 14 ACAD. MGMT. EXECUTIVES 124, 125 (2000).
331. Id.
332. Issacharoff & Nelson, supra note 109, at 358.
333. Bagenstos, supra note 126, at 26-27 (discussing the role of health insurance in
facilitating “independence and labor force participation” for people with disabilities).
334. See supra note 154 and accompanying text.
335. See supra Part III.A.2.
336. See supra Part IV.C.
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The influence of politics, lobbying, and interest groups on the
legislative process cannot be ignored. Consequently, the statutory
gaps may not be surprising and may be explained by a lack of
political support, organization, or lobbying strength. However, as a
policy matter, it would be desirable for the law in the very personal,
sensitive, and socially important area of employment discrimination
to be rational and consistent.
A focus on immutability and the recent addition of new pro-
tections under GINA and the ADAAA could provide advocates with
ammunition to promote the future inclusion of immutable charac-
teristics such as sexual orientation, appearance, parental and
marital status, and political affiliation. In the case of obesity and
homosexuality, change may come only with a shift in public
attitudes and a more widely held belief that these attributes are
immutable and deserve protection.337 The recent passage of the
Don’t Ask Don’t Tell Repeal Act,338 which will allow gay individuals
to serve openly in the military, may signal the beginnings of such a
shift with respect to sexual orientation. As already recognized by
liberal state civil rights laws and the Civil Service Reform Act,339
337. See Donald P. Haider-Markel & Mark R. Joslyn, Beliefs About the Origins of
Homosexuality and Support for Gay Rights: An Empirical Test of Attribution Theory, 72 PUB.
OPINION Q. 291, 295, 302 (2008), available at http://faculty.sgc.edu/rkelley/beliefs.pdf
(reporting 2003 Pew Research Center data in which 32 percent of respondents linked
homosexuality to genetic factors and 2006 Gallup poll data in which 41 percent of those
questioned did so); Oliver & Lee, supra note 312, at 933-34 (finding that 65 percent of
respondents attributed obesity to lack of willpower to diet and exercise and only 40 percent
believed it had a genetic component); Jane P. Sheldon et al., Beliefs About the Etiology of
Homosexuality and About the Ramifications of Discovering Its Possible Genetic Origin, 52 J.
HOMOSEXUALITY 111, 114-15 (2007) (reporting that Gallup poll data showed that in 2001, 40
percent of Americans believed individuals were born with their sexual orientation, up from
13 percent in 1977).
338. Don’t Ask Don’t Tell Repeal Act, Pub. L. No. 111-321 (2010).
339. See supra Part IV.C (discussing how these laws treat a variety of categories that are
not covered by the federal employment discrimination statutes). Several foreign countries
have opted for a more liberal approach as well. See, e.g., Equal Treatment Act, Stb. 230 (1994)
(Neth.) (Algemene wet gelijke behandeling, Wet van 2 maart 1994) (providing “protection
against discrimination on the grounds of religion, belief, political opinion, race, sex,
nationality, heterosexual or homosexual orientation or civil status” alongside other statutes
that prohibit discrimination based on disability and age); Employment Equity Act 55 of 1998
ch. 2, s. 6(1) (S. Afr.) (forbidding discrimination based on “race, gender, sex, pregnancy,
marital status, family responsibility, ethnic or social origin, colour, sexual orientation, age,
disability, religion, HIV status, conscience, belief, political opinion, culture, language and
birth”).
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coverage of additional traits could promote enhanced fairness, a
major policy goal of the employment discrimination statutes.340 
The concept of immutability, which focuses on the inability to
change, could ironically facilitate a transformation of the federal
employment discrimination statutory scheme. A commitment to
protect workers from discrimination based on immutability, in the
full sense of the word, may well lead to a more consistent and
complete antidiscrimination mandate in the employment field.
340. See supra Part III.B.3.
